National Tide 1980.

There are many mysterious and interesting things in this world.

Take 1990 as an example. For the economies of China and Japan, it was a crucial turning point that clearly distinguished them.

That year, our people experienced a period of prosperity following spiritual liberation and entered a more pragmatic historical phase.

As we have fortunately witnessed, although the new era has brought many new problems, the Republic has entered an unprecedented period of virtuous operation and has generated tremendous absorption capacity.

The ideological liberation of the 1980s brought unprecedented benefits to the Chinese people.

The pursuit that began in the 1990s has gradually eliminated the sense of loss and confusion caused by the value shock.

Overall, the anxiety about their own fate has become a thing of the past for most citizens of the republic.

Thus began the upward trajectory of the great Eastern power's national prosperity.

Whether in spirit or in material terms, the Republic at this time was full of hope, like the rising sun after a bath in the sea, ready to embark on a new journey.

Conversely, for Japan, which had prospered for decades by relying on its ties with the United States, this year marked the beginning of the "Heisei slump," and even ushered in decades of economic hardship.

Take the real estate industry for example. For the Republic, it is a burgeoning pillar industry that is about to flourish, containing countless opportunities to make money.

Even now, right here in Hainan, the capital of the People's Republic of China, an unprecedented real estate speculation frenzy is brewing and becoming increasingly difficult to contain.

However, for Japan, also in October 1990, the real estate sector, which had once accounted for half of Japan's economy during the bubble economy period, headed in a completely opposite direction to the major Eastern power.

After the Japanese stock market crashed, the "land price myth," which had become the last vestige of faith for the Japanese people in the Japanese economy, finally could not maintain its lofty position.

Not only did it resolutely show signs of collapse, but it also completely ushered in the hellish predicament of the Japanese economy.

The tide rises and falls, one thing diminishes while another waxes.

It's hard to tell whether this strange coincidence is a deliberate arrangement of fate or an inevitable trend of economic laws.

In fact, the trigger for this financial disaster was the Japanese government's further control and reduction of financing in the real estate sector in March 1990.

However, the real reason should be attributed to the backlash from the severe wealth inequality caused by the bubble economy, which actually reflects the widespread dissatisfaction in Japan regarding the class differences between those who own real estate and those who do not.

As is well known, for Japan, 1990 began with a continued plunge in stock prices.

With the appointment of Yasushi Mieno as governor of the Bank of Japan, the Bank of Japan switched to tightening measures and raised the statutory interest rate, resulting in the Japanese stock market losing 10,000 points of market value in just three months.

At the same time, the yen and Japanese government bonds were sold off, resulting in a "triple bearish" situation of yen depreciation, stock price decline, and bond price reduction.

However, the upward trend in Japanese land prices did not stop. As funds in the financial market chased after land, Japanese land and housing prices continued to rise dramatically throughout the year.

Not only did the price increases continue to widen in the central areas of major cities such as Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Sapporo, and Hiroshima, but this upward trend has also spread to tourist areas and surrounding areas.

If we use the average price Ning Weimin sold the land at as a benchmark, Tokyo land prices still increased by 7 percent.

While this delayed the complete collapse of Japan's bubble economy to some extent and allowed the Japanese people to maintain confidence in the future of the Japanese economy, it also shattered the dreams of most wage earners to own a small home.

As a result, public resentment boiled over, and many ordinary people applauded the phenomenon of "Isamu Onihira bursting the bubble," repeatedly calling on the government to further restrict speculative activities in Japanese real estate throughout the year.

This put immense pressure on then-Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, ultimately forcing him to prioritize controlling land prices as a key policy focus in order to win votes and order the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to implement strict and fair land-related financing policies.

As a result, in March 1990, the Ministry of Land and Resources tightened the loopholes that financial institutions and real estate companies could exploit, restricted the flow of funds in the real estate industry, and especially prohibited banks from providing residential loans to private individuals through the "housing special fund".

The result was like a powerful medicine, with remarkable effects.

At the end of the month, the total amount of loans to the Japanese real estate industry increased by 15 percent, but by October, the growth rate of total loans to real estate had fallen to less than 1 percent.

As a result, in line with the Bank of Japan's swift and decisive tightening policies, Japan's long-standing land bubble was finally burst.

From March to October, the price of residential land in Tokyo fell by as much as 10 percent.

It must be said that the actual results of this move were quite disastrous, far exceeding everyone's expectations.

Although the decline in the Japanese real estate market does not seem as severe as the stock market, which has already been halved.

The problem is that Japan's economic bubble burst, but its real economy declined. Under such circumstances, the real estate market has become the last fig leaf to maintain Japan's economic prosperity.

Without the unrealized gains from land appreciation, what can Japanese financial institutions and large corporations use to mask the reality of a sluggish real economy?

You can't even fill in profit on the financial statements anymore.

At the end of October, the third-quarter financial reports of Japanese companies were all bad news, with financial scandals causing a complete mess.

Moreover, in any market, one should buy when prices are rising and not when they are falling.

When the real estate market declines, fewer people want to buy, and more people want to sell.

The real estate market is different from the financial market; to exit, you can't just sell the property in the next order.

Completing a transaction involves on-site inspections, assessments, negotiations, registration, tax payments, and much more. It's not something you can just sell on a whim.

If you're even a step too late, you'll be suffocated inside.

This led to a stampede as many businesses and individuals rushed to flee the real estate market.

Then the Japanese stock market, which had finally begun to stabilize and rise, became what is known as a "dead cat bounce," and was dragged down again, leading to another sharp outflow of funds.

Then, this triggered a series of negative chain reactions, including but not limited to, sudden breaks in the capital chain, corporate bankruptcies, soaring unemployment, and rising suicide rates.

It can be said that this financial disaster was a complete collapse of the Japanese economy, with no industry, market, or company spared.

It not only affected the stability of Japanese society and the normal operation of the real economy, but also destroyed the Japanese financial market, shattered the public's unrealistic optimism about the prospects of the Japanese economy, and exposed the fragility of the Japanese economy.

As a result, not only did the Japanese media scathingly criticize government officials, but they also launched a barrage of harsh and scathing attacks on Tsuchida, the director of the Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Agency.

Western economics textbooks have thus come to see the flaws in the Japanese system and have stopped praising Japan's all-powerful government departments excessively.

But what is the use?
After all, the damage has already been done, the trend is irreversible, and it is too late. The Japanese economy is destined to "forge ahead" on the road to complete collapse.

Yes, this is a man-made disaster where public opinion hijacked politics, not a natural disaster.

It is precisely because of the limitations of Japan's social system that the Japanese authorities made the wrong moves at the wrong time.

As the saying goes, everyone has their own expertise. In the face of a crisis, the needs of ordinary people are often driven by irrational emotional reactions.

The biggest drawback of Western democracy lies in this: politicians often don't consider what is right, but rather how to please voters, or at least not offend them.

As we have already seen, the Japanese government's blind following of public opinion and its radical approach not only failed to alleviate social conflicts and solve livelihood issues, but also caused further bleeding and severe damage to the already stagnant Japanese economy.

That's not all; the long-term, painful, and inescapable aftereffects of the bubble are what truly matter. Just as the receding tide reveals a precipitous cliff, the complete collapse of the Japanese economy exposed the dark corruption that had long been hidden within Japan's financial sector.

In the summer of 1990, the corruption that had been accumulating in Japan during the bubble economy finally erupted, and a series of financial scandals were exposed.

The scandal involving Nomura and Nikko Securities involves compensation for losses in corporate special funds accounts.

Although these accounts are illegal, they have been privately recognized by the Ministry of Finance.

The existence of these accounts suggests that Japan's system favors insiders.

Once the stock market enters a downward trend, such arrangements gradually become intolerable.

As before, a scapegoat must be found to bear the collective sins of the entire society.

As a result, in June 1990, Yoshihisa Tabuchi, president of Nomura Securities, was forced to resign amid a compensation scandal, becoming the first resignation drama staged in the Japanese financial world to quell public outrage.

And this is just the beginning.

As the most profitable Japanese bank in the late 1980s, Sumitomo Bank soon followed suit and made a fool of itself.

It turns out that under the strong leadership of Chairman Ichiro Isoda, who was known as the "Emperor," Sumitomo maximized the value of the bubble economy.

Sumitomo not only massively expanded its real estate lending and used special funds accounts to increase revenue, but also had close ties with the Seiman Mortgage Company, run by its former employees, and engaged in many shady transactions.

As a result, after the real estate market began to decline, due to the involvement of its subsidiaries, the company's business scandals were also exposed, and it faced charges of forging painting appraisals, illegally inflating stock prices, and colluding with gangsters to intervene in the real estate market.

In order to protect its reputation, Sumitomo severed ties with Iseman Corporation, which cost it two billion US dollars.

However, misfortune never comes singly. Sumitomo's relationship with Ishii Takamasa, the second-generation leader of the Inagawa-kai, was subsequently exposed.

A branch manager at Sumitomo Corporation once persuaded a client to lend money to Ishii to help him accumulate Tokyu Corporation shares.

Ultimately, Sumitomo Bank's chairman, Isoda, had to take responsibility for the two scandals and, like the president of Nomura Securities, resigned in October 1990 after apologizing.

The negative consequence of this series of scandals was that it exacerbated public distrust of the financial industry, and the Ministry of Finance was forced to send special personnel to supervise the auditing of the accounts of Japanese financial institutions.

Although such investigations often outweigh their actual content in Japan's political and business environment, they still create a climate of fear and exacerbate the cash flow shortage in Japan's real economy.

This has led to a further widening of the cash shortage predicament for many enterprises, resulting in a cash crunch.

EIE Group, which had just caught its breath at the beginning of the year thanks to stock market speculation, is one such unfortunate case.

To be honest, although EIE bought too many meaningless assets due to Harunori Takahashi's aggressive strategy, Ning Weimin's intervention has already dealt with many potential problems in terms of debt.

The remaining assets are of relatively high quality, and the overseas assets that were previously neglected in management are gradually starting to get on track and generate profits. The overall operation of the group has basically stabilized.

If they are given another year or two of stable financial environment, they can gradually stand up on their own and won't have to sell off their assets at a loss anymore.

Even raising money through stock market manipulation is another option.

But reality is so cruel that there are no "what ifs".

Because of the scandals in the financial system, the operations of Changxin Bank have also been affected. As Changxin Bank's largest loan customer, EIE's accounts have to be audited.

So what was originally a minor issue suddenly became a loophole that needed to be fixed immediately, which meant drawing funds from the company to quickly raise money to repay the bank.

Moreover, with the stock market plummeting to such a level, the public has lost all confidence, and the Tokyo Stock Exchange is practically closed, so they can no longer make money through market manipulation.

To put it bluntly, every road is blocked.

At this moment, EIE was like someone who had just fallen and gotten up from the ground, only to be inexplicably hit by a bicycle coming from behind. He was extremely frustrated.

After discussions, the EIE board of directors concluded that the only option left was to sell assets to raise cash; they had no other choice.

What can we sell?

And who will they sell the assets to?

For a time, the next two questions seemed to become the focus of everyone's arguments, causing many people to worry.

As is customary, they would certainly prioritize Japanese affiliates.

Good relationships and trustworthiness can also benefit personal relationships.

But now Japan's economy is ruined, and nobody has any surplus grain.

Let alone getting a good price, the question is whether people are even willing to buy it.

Several board members made phone calls to their contacts, but the situation was not optimistic; not a single person had shown genuine interest.

What if it's sold to a foreign conglomerate?
Of course, that's fine too.

However, taking advantage of the chaos is inevitable.

In particular, the EIE Group was founded in 1970 and is a company with a relatively short operating history. The reason why it has developed so rapidly is due to the aggressive expansion of Harunori Takahashi.

When he acquired these shares, he offended many people. Now, if he wants to sell them, ask foreigners for prices, or even ask the original owners of these sub-properties, it would be tantamount to giving others an opportunity to get revenge.

Just thinking about it sends chills down your spine. Who would be willing to take such a fate for Harunori Takahashi?

So, after a series of seemingly accidental but actually inevitable events, Ning Weimin became the only candidate unanimously recognized by the EIE board of directors.

“President Ning is the most suitable trading partner for us. He is a very trustworthy person and will not cheat us, nor should he excessively lower our price. The key is that he has money on hand; he should have a lot of cash and should be able to meet our needs.”

“I agree, and his main business doesn’t compete much with ours, nor does he covet our assets in Europe and America. Selling our assets to him won’t create an enemy who can block our future path.”

"That's true, but since our businesses don't overlap, it means he's not very interested in our assets."

"Are we really going to sell those two buildings in Ginza to him? I remember Chairman Ning specifically asked us about this last time. That's Ginza, after all. If we sell them, we might never be able to buy them back..."

After a long silence, the oppressive atmosphere in the meeting room was finally broken by the head of the board of directors—Shigehiko Tanaka from Changxin Bank.

"No, since Chairman Ning is Chinese, there's something else he'll likely be interested in. Have someone contact him and tell them we have a new asset on our asset list—the Hong Kong Regent Hotel..."

"What? Regent Hotel? I remember that was a high-quality chain hotel asset that Takahashi spent two years acquiring. This one in Hong Kong is a high-end hotel with considerable profits."

"But it's not as good as the building in Ginza, right? You guys need to understand that we can only save our other assets if we sell to him. Otherwise, we'll suffer even more losses."

“That makes sense. So how much should we ask for? Takahashi spent almost 110 million US dollars to buy it back then. We should at least make a profit.”

"Of course I understand that. Tell Chairman Ning that our offer is 18 billion yen. This is the final price, and there is no room for negotiation. If he is interested, we hope to sign a contract within a week..." (End of Chapter)