African Entrepreneurship Records 2

Chapter 1520 The Paraná River Merchant Navigation Agreement

Chapter 1520 The Paraná River Merchant Navigation Agreement

Following the Chaco War, East Africa took the opportunity to enter Bolivia, and under East Africa's leadership, in late 1931, it held consultations with five countries—Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia—on issues such as navigation, management, and development of the Paraná River.

Montevideo, Uruguay.

East African Foreign Minister Friel personally led a delegation to the Uruguayan capital to communicate and negotiate with countries in the Paraná River basin.

"The Paraná River is the second largest river in South America, but in terms of economy, population, agriculture, etc., it is undoubtedly the most important river in South America, far surpassing the Amazon River, the world's largest river."

"Its drainage area is close to four million square kilometers and its length exceeds four thousand kilometers. The region has extremely high value in terms of hydropower, navigation, and irrigation. Therefore, the comprehensive management of the Paraná River will contribute to the common economic development of southern South America."

Clearly, the Paraná River that Friel refers to here is the Paraná River in a broad sense, which includes the Río de la Plata and the Uruguay River.

Because, strictly speaking, the Río de la Plata, the Uruguay River, and the Paraná River are three separate rivers, not one river, and even whether the Río de la Plata is a river is highly controversial.

If the Río de la Plata is defined as a gulf and part of the Atlantic Ocean, then the Paraná and Uruguay rivers would be equivalent to flowing directly into the Atlantic Ocean, and thus be independent rivers.

If we consider it as a river, then the River de la Plata is the final confluence of the Paraná and Uruguay rivers, sharing a single outlet to the sea, and the three can be viewed as a whole.

East Africa chose the latter in order to maximize its interests. Of course, to prevent loopholes, the draft treaty specifically noted this point.

Foreign Minister Friel stated, "The Paraná River basin is the most fertile region in all of South America, and it is also the heart of the land of each country. Therefore, all countries should put aside their prejudices, cooperate sincerely, and jointly promote the overall development of the region within the basin, so as to achieve common progress and prosperity."

This statement is largely true, but not entirely accurate. At least for Bolivia, the Paraná River basin is not that important. As a landlocked country, Bolivia has three options for accessing the sea: via Peru, via Brazil, and via the countries in the Paraná River basin.

Peru and Bolivia have a relatively close relationship, and the two countries were even once one country. Therefore, most of Bolivia's exports are transshipped through Peru.

Then there's the route through Brazil, because northeastern Bolivia is also part of the Amazon River basin. In the last century, in order to obtain Brazil's consent for Bolivia's river passage rights, Bolivia even gave up some of its eastern territory.

Of course, in hindsight, this was an extremely foolish decision. Firstly, in terms of resources, the world's largest iron ore mine in the previous life became shared by the two countries. Secondly, the Paraguay River, an important tributary of the Paraná River, was also out of reach of Bolivia. This route was clearly no worse than those tributaries in the Amazon River basin.

Finally, the reason why the Paraná River basin is not important to Bolivia at present is entirely due to policy. Bolivia's focus is not on the southeast, and the defeat in the Chaco War caused it to miss some important waterways.

Even in the 21st century of the previous life, Bolivia was unable to develop its local resources, which prevented the exploitation of its rich iron ore resources in the southeast.

In theory, if the Mutum iron ore mine can be developed, Paraguay could become a major resource-based country in the world, comparable to Australia and Brazil in the iron ore trade. After all, Bolivia is different in size from these two countries, with a small population, and the Mutum iron ore mine alone could enrich the entire country.

However, it doesn't matter if the Bolivian government doesn't have such vision. Now that East Africans have arrived, they will naturally make relevant arrangements, and the Paraná River Merchant Navigation Agreement is one of them.

Foreign Minister Friel said, "East Africa will help countries develop cities, ports, industries, agriculture and other sectors along the rivers."

"We will focus on promoting the development of important port cities such as Asunción, Rosario, Colomba, Suárez, and Salto, and strengthen investment and support for various countries in the industrial and agricultural sectors."

Asunción is the capital of Paraguay and the first region in South America where East African capital entered. However, despite being located on the banks of the Paraná River, Asunción remains an inland city.

This means that East Africa cannot strengthen its control over the entire Paraná River basin through Paraguay, as its outlet to the sea is basically controlled by Argentina and Uruguay. Therefore, if East Africa wants the Paraná River to be navigable, it must appease these two countries.

Uruguay has virtually no ability to resist East Africa, so Argentina poses the greatest obstacle to East Africa's control of the Paraná River shipping route.

Previously, Argentina was heavily influenced by British capital, so the government was basically controlled by pro-British factions, and Britain was clearly unwilling to see East African forces expand smoothly in South America.

Before 1931, Argentina's relationship with East Africa was not exactly tense, but it was basically one of non-interference. The Argentine government did not want East Africa to interfere in its internal affairs, nor did it want East Africa to enter South America, but it did not have the courage to provoke East Africa.

Therefore, Argentina's response to its South American policy toward East Africa is "non-cooperation," which means not participating in East African organizations and activities in South America, remaining aloof, and calling on countries in the region to maintain their independence and reduce the space for intervention by major powers.

In other words, Argentina has always wanted to be the leader in South America, but it is completely powerless to stop major powers like the United States, Britain, and East Africa. It dares not make any big moves, but it does a lot of small, underhanded actions.

Coupled with the "befriend distant states while attacking nearby ones" mentality, Argentina was more inclined to win over Britain to counterbalance its "near neighbor" East Africa.

However, this situation changed dramatically in 1930. On the one hand, due to the economic crisis, commercial cooperation between Argentina and Britain was essentially dismantled, and the two sides could not reconcile their interests in the field of trade.

Previously, Britain was Argentina's most important buyer of agricultural products, but after the outbreak of the British economic crisis, Britain was naturally unable to maintain the original trade cooperation. At the same time, compared with its own children such as Canada and Australia, Britain's agricultural imports naturally prioritized meeting the needs of its own colonies.

Economically, the breakdown of trade between Argentina and Britain directly led to a decline in Argentina's income, bankruptcies of many farmers and urban residents, and triggered an internal political crisis in Argentina.

As a result, the Argentine military government came to power in 1930, which further exacerbated the conflict between the two countries.

Of course, the relationship between the Argentine military government and East Africa was not very good either, because its leader, Uriburu, was an "extreme nationalist" who advocated the "Italian model," namely the Benito regime.

What extreme nationalists have in common is their great ambition. In Uriburu's mind, Argentina is the natural leader of South America.

This clashed with East Africa's strategy, as East Africa's aggressive expansion in South America somewhat hindered the implementation of Uriburu's ideas. For example, in his previous life, he interfered in Bolivia's internal affairs, attempting to overthrow the democratically elected government and compete with Brazil.

Now, Bolivia and Paraguay are controlled by East Africa, and East Africa's influence over Uruguay is also deepening. Therefore, East Africa has become the biggest obstacle for Argentina to expand its influence and sphere of influence in South America.

Under these circumstances, Argentina should have further deteriorated its relations with East Africa, but the opposite has happened. After Uriburu came to power, he not only did not oppose East Africa, but also unprecedentedly strengthened cooperation with East Africa at this stage.

The reason is quite simple: Uriburu's rise to power was illegitimate, and he was unpopular in Argentina.

This is fundamentally different from the Benito government in Italy, which first became the Prime Minister of Italy and then mobilized Italian nationalist sentiment to seize power.

Uriburu's rise to power was a direct military coup, which resulted in him having many opponents within Argentina and his rule being unstable.

Suppose that if Argentina offends East Africa at this time, and East Africa uses the illegitimacy of the Uriburu government as a pretext to rally various opposition forces in Argentina, then the Uriburu government would very likely be overthrown.

After all, Uriburu relies on his army, so he can suppress opposition forces through force. However, East Africa has no shortage of military power. As long as East Africa enters Argentina under the banner of restoring democracy, it may gain a large number of supporters. Of course, the premise is that East Africa withdraws afterward.

Currently, East Africa has troops stationed in Paraguay and Bolivia, not to mention the entire South Atlantic. The East African Navy is the only dominant force in the region. Therefore, Uriburu is very wary of East Africa, but due to its strength, he has no choice but to submit.

In addition, Argentina's current economic situation also requires cooperation between Uriburu and East Africa to curb Argentina's dire economic situation.

In short, in order to maintain its own interests and rule, Uriburu not only dared not offend East Africa, but also actively courted East Africa.

Therefore, the Argentine military government also sent representatives to actively participate in the Paraná River Merchant Navigation Agreement, seeking to gain more benefits for its country.

For example, Rosario, which Foreign Minister Freire mentioned earlier, is located on the banks of the Paraná River. It is Argentina's third largest city, an important railway and shipping center, and the hometown of Ernesto Raffaele Guevara de la Cerna, a famous international Labour Party fighter.

On the one hand, the Argentine military government feared East African interference in Argentina's internal affairs; on the other hand, it needed to find a substitute for Britain, restore agricultural exports, and develop its own industries.

Therefore, East Africa became an important choice. East Africa was already one of the major consumers of Argentine agricultural products, and during the economic crisis, East Africa was the country least affected by the capitalist world. Therefore, the Argentine military government hoped that East Africa would increase its imports of Argentine agricultural products.

At the same time, East Africa is the world's largest industrial country, and its industrial strength is beyond doubt. Introducing East African capital to invest in Argentine cities and industries is also an important area of ​​cooperation for the Uriburu government.

In return, East Africa promised not to interfere in Argentina's internal affairs. As for economic cooperation between the two countries, the prerequisite is that Argentina agrees to and signs a free navigation agreement with East Africa. If Argentina agrees, East Africa will give Argentina appropriate economic support.

This is Argentina, and then Brazil. East Africa doesn't pay much attention to Brazil's role in the Paraná River basin. However, if the iron ore resources in northern Bolivia and western Brazil are developed and transported back to East Africa by water, then the rivers within Brazil will be unavoidable.

Therefore, the port of Colomba in Brazil has become an important project jointly built by the two countries. This port is not far from the iron ore area. In the future, East Africa will most likely import iron ore from western Brazil through the port of Colomba on the Paraguay River, and finally transport it to the steel industry base in western East Africa via the Paraná River into the Atlantic Ocean.

Suarez is a stronghold in Bolivia, which was also the location of the former Bolivian port of Suarez, very close to the port of Colombo.

The reason why East Africa is cooperating with Bolivia to build another port, Suarez, next to the port of Colombo in Brazil, is entirely based on the principle of "not putting all your eggs in one basket".

At the same time, the port of Suarez is also an important project for East Africa to strengthen its economic penetration and control over Bolivia. After the Mutún iron ore mine is developed, Bolivia will basically only be able to export to East Africa through the port of Suarez, and the iron ore will become an important economic lifeline and pillar of the country.

Finally, there's Salto, Uruguay's second-largest city and the largest city along the Uruguay River. East Africa emphasizes a holistic approach to development.

Foreign Minister Friel stated, "The Paraná River basin will become the most industrially and agriculturally developed region in South America in the future. Through shipping, the economies of various countries will be closely linked, and no country may obstruct the free passage of merchant ships from all countries and East Africa within the basin."

"Otherwise, we will become the target of everyone's criticism. In order to safeguard the interests of all countries, coordinate the management of the Paraná River basin, ensure shipping safety, protect the interests of relevant countries, and resolve disputes among countries, we in East Africa will also increase our coordination in this region."

Although not explicitly stated, Friel's words indicate that East Africa will strengthen its military presence in the Paraná River basin, building military bases in Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia.

As for Argentina and Brazil, although East Africa will not directly build military bases or station troops there, as long as they gain a foothold in the other three countries, East Africa's dominance over the Paraná River basin will be basically secure.

The East African Naval Association will lease a port in Uruguay to serve as a new military base on the western coast of the South Atlantic, replacing Asunción's previous role.

This also means that the East African Atlantic Fleet has, for the first time, acquired a stable naval base in southern South America to house a large fleet, thus deterring various countries in the basin, especially Argentina and Brazil.

This is already the result of a compromise between East Africa and Argentina and Brazil. Although the presence of the East African Navy in Paraguay poses a great threat to the two countries, it is still better than East Africa building its naval base on the mainland of the two countries.

Therefore, faced with a powerful East Africa, both countries had no choice but to accept it. East Africa is different from countries like the United States and the United Kingdom because it is just across the ocean. This also means that if East Africa were to launch a war against the two countries, they would only be able to take the hits.

Throughout the South Atlantic, just like the Indian Ocean, the East African Navy can basically go anywhere freely, and the navies of other countries in the region have no ability to compete with the East African Navy.

Britain and the United States, being North Atlantic coastal nations, while possessing formidable naval strength, find it inconvenient to project power in the South Atlantic like the East African navy. A misstep could lead them to repeat the fate of the Russian navy in the Russo-Japanese War.

Similarly, this is also the main reason why the East African Navy has difficulty playing a role in the North Atlantic.

(End of this chapter)

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