My life is like walking on thin ice

Chapter 597 Paradox
The reasoning couldn't be simpler.

Guan A's opinion that Guan Meng was too old indicates that there were younger candidates among the options available to Guan A.
The fact that Guan Fu was considered reckless and useless also shows that there were more composed and steady generals under Guan A's command—generals who could win battles not by sheer passion and so-called 'bravery,' but by their intellect and strategy.

However, this situation is not common.

—For their own private armies and generals, the principle followed by most meritorious marquises was simply to make do with what they had.

For example, if a farmer's family went bankrupt or even died during a lockdown, leaving behind only one child;

At such times, the noblemen would "take pity" and bring the orphan back to their mansions, sending him to be a playmate for the heir apparent.

They were supposed to be playmates, but the games they played together were things like "how to help the Marquis's son block arrows," "how to protect the Marquis's son on the battlefield," and "how to guard the Marquis's son's military tent."

When these children grow up, the heir apparent inherits the title and becomes a marquis. When war comes, he pats his childhood playmate on the shoulder and says, "To achieve merit and establish a career on this mission, we will rely on you, young man..."

They seem like they're raising assassins, but not entirely.

After all, nobles don't keep such private soldiers to assassinate anyone, but rather as reserve troops for their own private army when they go to war.

Such reserve soldiers often do not need to be particularly good at fighting, nor do they need to have a high level of military command skills.

After all, on the battlefield, the private armies of nobles only numbered a hundred or so people, and they did not need to shoulder the task of attacking the front lines of the battlefield.

It's just about winning battles when things are going well and picking up kills; there's really no need to recruit a few minor figures like Han Xin or Xiang Yu to support.

The goal is simply to take a 'participation-oriented' stroll around the battlefield, so the manpower should be as easy to maintain and as low in cost as possible.

Ideally, food would be provided on ordinary days—two bowls of millet porridge a day, and a bite of meat on holidays;

Accommodation: A dozen or so people and the gatekeeper of the Marquis's mansion squeezed into one room, as long as there was a place to lie down;
"Guan Chuan" means that every year or two, a new piece of old clothing is selected and distributed.

When needed, he can help with farming, move bricks and plaster in construction, and if he's really idle, he can be lent out to earn some wages.

Then, when war comes, once you put on your armor and hang your longsword, you can go to war...

This is the most cost-effective 'family soldier', or rather, 'family servant'.

In stark contrast to the extremely low entry requirements for these private soldiers—who 'don't need to be particularly outstanding, almost anyone will do'—they were equipped with luxurious weaponry on the battlefield.

Noble private armies are allowed to wear armor during wartime!
Moreover, it was a private army of about a hundred men, all fully armored!
This is somewhat puzzling.

—When you're choosing people, do you not think about choosing those who are strong, robust, and capable of fighting?
When you're training them, you don't think about practicing their martial arts or honing their skills in killing enemies;
Once they get to the battlefield, they're willing to give them armor?

The answer to this question actually points directly to the core logic of the Han Dynasty nobles in their pursuit of KPIs by 'picking up heads' on the battlefield.

Float and chop.

It's still the same old story: 'floating cut'.

For the "official troops" belonging to the central government or local counties, the term "floating execution" was an important, even the only, battlefield indicator that could not be ignored in the past.

If the floating slash is positive, then even if there is a tactical mistake on the battlefield, the punishment will likely not be too severe.
Conversely, if a floating slash is negative, then even if one charges into battle, kills generals and captures flags, there is no way to atone for the mistake; each matter must be dealt with separately.

If a negative score in the floating cut is enough to warrant execution, then betraying one's lord is a capital offense.
If there is merit, the punishment will be reduced from the death penalty to imprisonment, corporal punishment, dismissal from office, or a mere fine, depending on the magnitude of the merit.

Of course, after Liu Rong reformed the Han army system and the standards for calculating military merits, the "floating kill" was no longer the only truth on the battlefield, nor was it something that generals would do anything to pursue.

But this does not mean that the floating slash has lost all its meaning.

A simple example of passing.

You are a squad leader with 500 soldiers under your command. On the battlefield, you are assigned to intercept an enemy force of 300 men.

With superior troop strength and the advantage of being well-rested, they first ambushed and then intercepted the enemy, gaining a significant advantage.

The result was quite unexpected—when the battle losses were tallied after the war, it turned out that more than half of your 500 soldiers had died in the process of trying to hold off the enemy's 300 men!
The loss of more than 250 men, and the failure to annihilate the enemy's 300 soldiers, resulted in the escape of several dozen more!

good;
Calculating the casualties, your unit killed or captured 260-270 people, and suffered 250 casualties, which is a casualty count of over ten.

Do you have the nerve to boast to others about "in this battle, my unit's kills were the best"?
Forget about showing off—once you leave the battlefield, if you don't draw your sword and slit your own throat, you'll be verbally abused and drowned in spittle by the troops who participated in the battle.

是；
Emperor Liu Rong established a new system, where the punishment of "floating cut" no longer represented everything.

But it simply means 'no longer everything' or 'no longer the sole indicator'.

Even if the system no longer indiscriminately punishes generals for negative or rewardes them for positive stats, everyone still has their own scale in their hearts.

Who can fight and who can't, who knows how to fight and who doesn't, can all be discerned through the floating slash.

Therefore, after Liu Rong reformed the military merit calculation system, the term "floating execution" did not disappear directly from the Han dynasty.

Instead, it has transformed from past legal provisions and rigid regulations into an informal, vague standard of judgment that exists only in people's minds.

Just like in later modern times, betrayal of the family by one spouse was downgraded from a criminal act that must be punished to a morally reprehensible act that does not violate the law.

But this does not mean that being unfaithful to one's husband/wife, betraying one's family, or having extramarital affairs is no longer 'wrong';
However, even if they no longer break the law and are no longer subject to legal sanctions, they are still subject to moral condemnation from public order and good morals.

The significance of the term "floating execution" in the context of the Han Dynasty today is similar to this situation.

—A negative score is no longer a crime, and a positive score is no longer a merit.
Perhaps centuries from now, even the most basic-minded people will be able to comprehensively assess a general's contributions in a particular war and conclude that "although many people died, it was worthwhile" or "although many enemies were killed, it was a loss."

However, the overwhelming trend of history and the inertia formed by the floating execution system over hundreds of years have long been deeply rooted in the hearts of people all over the world.

If a general commits a fatal blow in a battle, even if Liu Rong does not punish him, the people of the world will still condemn him.

—For example, Cheng Bushi was criticized by everyone after the Battle of Chaona, and was only saved by Liu Rong's personal intervention.
Similarly, if a general performs a brilliant strike in a battle, even if Liu Rong belittles him as worthless, he can still become a hero in the eyes of the people.

For example, there was the Flying General Li Guang, who was repeatedly "targeted" by Liu Rong and even transferred to the inland as a prefect, yet still caused the world to lament and sigh that "the country has lost a fierce general." Of course, from the official and legal perspectives, the term "execution by floating stake" is no longer forcibly linked to whether a general has made merits or demerits in a war.

It's no longer uncommon for a negative result to result in merit, or a positive result to result in a negative result.

Interestingly, the merits and demerits of nobles in a war, or their 'KPI' performance indicators, are also determined by their merits and demerits.

Moreover, due to Liu Rong's intentional or unintentional 'oversight', the reform of the military merit evaluation standards did not affect the evaluation of the battlefield merits and demerits of the noble private armies.

In other words, the phrase "floating execution" does not entirely lack legal significance in the Han Dynasty.

At least when nobles and marquises led armies into battle, and when calculating KPIs after the war, the evaluation criteria of the Chang'an court were still the outdated system of appropriation.

This leads to a very absurd paradox.

On the one hand, when the nobles and marquises spontaneously formed armies and paid for their own military expenses when war broke out, their purpose was not to make further contributions, but merely to retain their existing status and achieve a certain level of KPIs.

The nature is roughly equivalent to: let the world see that the nobles and marquises are not parasites who sit on the back of their ancestors' merits and live off their wealth.
The fiefdoms granted by the ancestral temples and the state, along with the agricultural taxes provided by the people of those fiefdoms, were not used by the nobles for indulgence and pleasure—at least not entirely.

When the ancestral temples and the state are in peril, these "meat eaters" who usually indulge in cockfighting, dog racing, and debauchery still have the awareness to pay out of their own pockets, raise their own troops, and bravely face the national crisis.

On this basis, in order to prove that they were not just empty of attitude and awareness, but also possessed some of the excellent genes of their ancestors, the nobles who participated in the war also had to obtain some decent and respectable merits.

This is the fundamental logic behind the Han dynasty's meritorious nobles' practice of "protecting the country at their own expense" when war broke out.

At this point, the true nature of this seemingly dignified act by the noble marquises becomes self-evident.

—It's purely for show, to go through the motions, to 'gild' the battlefield, or to put on a show.

They put on a grand facade of sharing weal and woe with the nation;
To put on a tough guy act like "like father, like son";

He put on an air of magnanimity, believing himself to be worthy of his position, so that the world would respect him and allow such a parasite as himself to exist.

Then the problem becomes obvious.

It's just for show, just going through the motions, so there's no need for real battle-hardened soldiers or invincible elites. They can just use a showy facade to get by.

why?
It's cheap!
Since ancient times, China has been known for its scholars being poor while its warriors are rich!

To train a proper, elite soldier, you have to feed him meat from a young age, soak him in medicinal soup, and find a teacher to guide him.

As for being completely off-the-job from a young age, that's not even worth mentioning.

It is no exaggeration to say that in this generation, the cost of raising a child to adulthood and turning him into a valiant warrior on the battlefield—in terms of economic cost alone—is enough to train at least dozens of scholars.

After all, the biggest cost of studying is simply that able-bodied people have to take time off work.

Becoming an apprentice is merely a matter of paying tuition, and reading books can be done by borrowing books or taking notes.

Unlike martial arts training, which requires a renowned master to teach you step by step for over a decade, even without considering tuition fees, the cost of meat for both teacher and student, as well as the medical expenses for injuries, is far beyond what ordinary families can afford.

You might ask, could the noble families and marquises of the Han dynasty afford such a huge cost?

of course can.

In the current Han Dynasty, a Marquis of Che has at least 500 households in his fief, and his annual tax income is at least 5,000 shi of grain, worth at least 200,000 coins.

Although a large portion of these 200,000 coins would be used for the pomp and circumstances expected of a marquis and for social interactions within his social circle, it wouldn't be difficult to extract 10,000 or 20,000 coins, or a few hundred bushels of grain, from this sum if one was willing.

These ten thousand or eight thousand coins and several hundred bushels of grain would be enough to feed—and even a 'shameless' elite guard of no more than ten men.

After all, in this era, the military rations for soldiers were only two shi per person per month, and twenty-four shi per year.

Even so, these are still wartime quotas, and in peacetime, they will be reduced by a portion.

But for noble families, the key issue regarding these elite guards who have been out of work since childhood and trained in martial arts full-time is not whether they can afford to support them, but whether they are necessary.

Take, for example, a low-ranking Marquis with a fief of 500 shi (a unit of grain measure). When he went out, he only needed one coachman, one old servant to accompany him, and three to five guards.

Although grooms are considered a 'skilled trade,' they are clearly not a particularly scarce talent; they are basically provided with food and lodging.

The old servant might be a bit troublesome, but fortunately, only one is needed, and the cost is not much.

As for the guards—in this era, the status of a nobleman of the Marquis of Che was something that villains and treacherous people dared not approach.

Even if we take a step back and assume that someone is determined to kill a meritorious nobleman, then let alone three or five guards—even if there are thirty or fifty, or three or five hundred—it will still be of no use.

Imagine the scene back then: when Liu Wu, the Prince of Liang, saw his dream of becoming the "Crown Prince" shattered, he immediately went on a rampage, ordering the execution of many court officials. What was that like?

Not to mention the guards of the marquises and court officials, even the imperial guards of the northern and southern armies suffered several casualties!

This infuriated the late Emperor, who was so enraged that he almost slammed his fist on the table with Empress Dowager Dou!

To put it bluntly, when nobles and high-ranking officials went out, the guards they brought with them, whether three or five people or thirty or fifty, were ultimately just for show, to make up the numbers and create an impression.

Of the 10,000 times that the Marquis went out, 9,999 times he did not need these guards to play a role.

If it really comes down to that one in ten thousand unexpected chance, it doesn't matter whether there are guards or not; it's just a matter of a few more guards dying.

This makes it easy to see that for noble families, neither the guards they keep by their side on a daily basis nor the private army they bring to the battlefield when necessary are essential, or rather, not worth investing heavily in training.

However, when nobles go to war, they have to meet certain KPIs regarding how much merit they must achieve.

Unfortunately, the KPI calculation method is that potentially unscientific, but absolutely fair, floating-cut system...

(End of this chapter)