The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 104 Open the secret (5)
But the Joint Chiefs also recognized the appeal of "loosing Chiang Kai-shek's chains" (as MacArthur put it).In accordance with the opinion of the Foreign Aid Group, they did not rule out the possibility of considering the Kuomintang's actions against the mainland.Bradley doesn't see any capacity for such action "now." "Their leadership is terrible, their equipment is terrible, their training is terrible. When these conditions improve to a certain extent, I think this issue can be reconsidered and that action taken." Chesson testified a few days later that he did not even think about counterattacking the mainland.The "top priority" of the Kuomintang is to defend Taiwan. "I don't think you can talk about anything they can't do, which doesn't make sense at the moment."

All of these testimonies were expunged from the record released to the public and the press.The Joint Chiefs of Staff had little choice in press-censoring claims about Chiang Kai-shek's weaknesses.Allowing MacArthur's inaccurate testimony to go unchallenged would paint the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a group unwilling to use an ally in North Korea that should be the best fighting ally.But revealing the truth about Chiang's army, especially its potential to capitulate and defect at the first opportunity, would provide Beijing with immeasurably valuable intelligence.Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff kept the testimony secret through press censorship.

For the rest of the 20s, and even into the 50s, this decision of the Joint Chiefs reverberated in American public life.Republican politicians were clamoring about "loosing Chiang Kai-shek's chains," as if it were just a restraining rope keeping the Kuomintang general from yapping and yapping to crush the Communists.That's not the case.The American chain did not bind Chiang Kai-shek, but saved him.Had it been loosened, the communists would have ended the Chinese civil war in a short time.

Marshall disapproved of MacArthur's war strategy because "it could have dire consequences."Because MacArthur was "preoccupied with North Korea", he was unaware of the problems between Washington and the allies and the "special difficulty" of maintaining a majority in the United Nations.Marshall preferred Ridgway's method of inflicting on the enemy "the greatest number of casualties we can inflict, thereby destroying not only the morale of the Chinese army but its entire force structure".

In a sense, Marshall said, the situation in North Korea could be compared to the Berlin blockade crisis of 1948-1949, when the Soviets blocked western ground access to the isolated city in Soviet-occupied Germany.Marshall was Secretary of State at the time.On several occasions, Marshall said, the fight over Berlin "looked like a stalemate, but we remained calm and won a respectable victory in the end." "There are those who want to end this situation by breaking through the Russian blockade, though this may trigger a war. . . . But we refuse to take that risk so long as other means exist to achieve our ends." Likewise Indeed, in Greece, the fight to thwart a communist uprising took 18 months, and policy critics say: "This is a hopeless venture...we are wasting... our economic and military aid to the country. "

Marshall could not condone MacArthur's actions.When a military commander writes to a member of Congress, he—

Great care must be taken.I have had to write thousands of letters...but I don't think I have ever involved myself in criticizing the Commander in Chief to a member of Congress of the party concerned. ... You've been preaching loyalty, and you're dealing with an organization in which a soldier has an order from even a captain that will cost him his life or his wounds, but he must obey. ...it has to be instinctive.Well, if this example is the opposite at the highest level, then you have a very serious situation.

I think General MacArthur would have benefited greatly if he had voluntarily been invited to come here and talk to the President about these many things, to get in touch with the reactions he couldn't hear, instead of talking in Japan in an ambiguous way of.

For MacArthur's specific plan, Marshall did not agree at all.The vastness of China makes air strikes impossible. "You bombed a coastal city, or an inland city, and I don't think that accomplished much." The Japanese failed to occupy the country despite spreading their forces "all over China."Marshall preferred to eliminate the Chinese in North Korea.The first North Korean force had been eaten by MacArthur, and the first large Chinese army thrown into North Korea was "largely torn in pieces and nearly wiped out"; Into several pieces, so that they are unable to carry out effective operations, and will not be able to carry out effective operations for a period of time in the future."No army can sustain the losses suffered by the Chinese.

Even in his testimony, Marshall sensed (and has indicated so to senators) that in the coming weeks American policy would develop to such an extent that the administration no longer needed to solve the problem of expanding the war to end it up.Marshall was encouraged rather than discouraged by the fact that the Chinese would continue their spring offensive.Ridgway's "Operation Butcher" (see Chapter No. 17) had caused extremely heavy losses to the Chinese in April and early May.In Marshall's words:
The best possibility we see at the moment is... the communists go on the offensive and hope we get good weather so we can hit them as hard as we've done in the last two weeks aka we've broken them training The vital force of a well-trained army.

(General Bradley agreed in his testimony two weeks later: "I believe it is widely believed that we will be in a better position to make political terms after we have stopped this New Year's offensive than We are far better off going for a negotiation and a ceasefire before we let them know they can't get us out of North Korea.")
Regarding MacArthur's insistence on expressing his opinion even when it ran counter to government policy, Marshall recalled his frequent "difficult situations" with President Roosevelt on World War II policy, and his An example of "often in a difficult position" before congressional committees, but "I honestly think it would be disastrous for me to be openly antagonized by my Commander-in-Chief".He argued privately with Roosevelt; once decisions were made, he supported them.MacArthur should have done the same, or he should have resigned.Marshall gave another example of obeying orders: General John Pershing led an expedition into Mexico in 1916 in pursuit of renegade revolutionary Francisco “Panco” Villa.President Wilson wished to confine himself to direct action against Villa, rather than risk an all-out war with Mexico.He ordered Pershing not to commandeer the trains of the Mexican National Railway, even though there was no other means of transportation there.Later, Pershing was ordered to withdraw when he was almost on the verge of capturing Vera.Dismayed as he was, Pershing did not say a word about the reasons for the withdrawal to his staff, let alone to the public.

Marshall disputed MacArthur's claim that the bombing ban gave the Communist Party an unfair advantage.In testimony that was censored at the time, Marshall said: "The advantages our forces lose on the ground [by not bombing 'Manchuria'] are actually outweighed by the gains we gain from not taking our weaknesses into account. Expose to the enemy's air attack." The United Nations' targets in North Korea are relatively concentrated, while China's targets are scattered and changeable.The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned about "extremely vulnerable" Pusan, North Korea's only deep-water port and a choke point for UN military supplies. "Because the docks are all close together, and the ships are close together," Marshall testified, "the supply depots can only be dispersed to a certain extent."

Marshall and the other chiefs of staff emphasized that the Communist Party was also fighting a limited war.Bradley, pushing back against Georgia Sen. Walter George's claim that China is fighting an "all-out war," said: "They haven't used the air force to attack our front-line troops, our ports ... our bases in Japan or Our naval forces.” Overall, Bradley argued, “we’re fighting on terms that are pretty good for us.”Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg agreed, saying "the so-called sanctuary thing is going on on both sides."

In testimony censored by the press, Vandenberg also offered practical reasons for not bombing north of the Yalu River.The Communist air base north of the border is equipped with radar-controlled anti-aircraft artillery groups, "according to our activities on the Yalu River line, these artillery fires are very accurate."The United States also does not have the capability to conduct sustained air strikes:
The Air Force of the United States ... is really a small Air Force, and the forces we have out there now to carry out this tactical mission are really only a quarter of all the forces we can muster today.Even if four times as many troops were placed there, it would be just a drop in the ocean for the vast China.

Marshall said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not veto MacArthur's request to authorize him to immediately bomb "Manchuria" military installations. The main deterrent factor was the fear of China's retaliatory air strikes.Army Chief of Staff General Collins elaborated on this a few days later.As Collins recounts, MacArthur first requested bombing rights when X Corps was resupplying through Xingnan.If bombing north of the Yalu River is allowed—

We were extremely concerned that by doing so, we might be attacked by Russian planes...and possibly submarines during the dangerous period of retreat from Xingnan.Troops evacuated from such a port on merchant ships are extremely vulnerable to air and underwater attack.In my judgment, this would be an overly risky step.

Likewise, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not agree to authorize the maximum bombing of North Korean targets because of postwar political strategy.According to General Collins, the U.S. was looking forward to a unified Korea after the war, "and the North Koreans might not accept it if we went and bombed their cities."

Neither Marshall nor the Chiefs of Staff disagreed with MacArthur's view that the ROK was a "fantastic force."In testimonies that were heavily censored, Marshall, Bradley and Collins all made scathing comments about the South Korean military.In the most recent Chinese attack, one South Korean division, the 6th Division, was "totally broken and offered virtually no resistance," Marshall said.Under the first attack, the South Korean army retreated 18 to 20 miles, "really did not engage in any fighting... In this way, the troops on both sides are in a very difficult situation."In response to a question from Senator Johnson, Bradley estimated that the South Korean military had lost enough weapons to equip 11 divisions in the past 10 months this year. "Every time they got hit by a Chinaman," Collins said, "they just ran away."

Marshall persevered through an ordeal of tedious questions about U.S. policy toward China during his years as presidential envoy and secretary of state, as well as the exhausting repetition of questions by his opponents.Again and again he recounted the events of the days leading up to MacArthur's dismissal, explaining why the United States could not accept the use of Chiang Kai-shek's forces in Korea.

Only once did Marshall express his personal loathing for MacArthur.On the seventh day of his testimony, minutes before he left the witness stand, Senator John Spackman of Alabama read a United Press International news report reporting MacArthur's comments on President Truman's January 1 Views of telegrams sent to him.The cable acknowledged that MacArthur probably knew it was necessary to withdraw from North Korea, but urged him to try to hold out for diplomatic reasons.General Courtney Whitney, MacArthur's spokesman (according to the U.P. Press), said Truman intended to withdraw from North Korea and "use the Eighth Army as a scapegoat for failure."Does Marshall want to comment on that, Sparkman asked?
Marshall said Truman's telegram itself made it clear that the president had no intention of scapegoating the Eighth Army with "the utmost indifference."Marshall blushed, and his voice became severe: "That would be treason."

Sparkman agreed with this and read the article again.Marshall interrupted him: "You know, I didn't pick this lieutenant (Whitney)." As Sparkman continued, Marshall interrupted him roughly and grimly: "I don't want to discuss this, see MP."

Marshall never raised his voice, but everyone who heard him had no doubt that he held great contempt for MacArthur and those around him.

In the following weeks, the chiefs of staff who testified after General Marshall added nothing new to the voluminous testimony, but they all unanimously rejected MacArthur's proposal.General Bradley outlined the overarching strategic considerations driving the Joint Chiefs of Staff's plan: "Red China is not a great power seeking world domination. Frankly, in the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy will lead us to Wrong place, wrong time, wrong war with wrong enemy.” Taking on China promises only “bigger stalemate at a higher cost” and does nothing to ensure victory in North Korea.Following MacArthur's suggestion, there would be a "real danger" of bringing the Soviets into the war.

Republicans, led by Senator Alexander Wiley, did add a new problem to the process: Now that the president had given Bradley permission to testify, he should talk about his conversation with Truman about MacArthur's firing.Republican senators suspected an evil force behind the dismissal—the hated Acheson, perhaps even the British.Bradley declined, saying he considered himself a classified adviser and that Chairman Russell affirmed his right not to repeat conversations with the president. (The committee voted 18 to 8 to confirm Russell's decision.)
Since administration officials have said the same thing and have not budged under cross-examination, even when asked the same question five or six times, the Republicans have settled on secondary issues.Senator William Nolan of California expressed outrage at the fact that Vernes Anderson had taken notes on Wake Island without General MacArthur's knowledge (as the general claimed). "What if there's an assassin behind the partition?" Nolan asked.Bradley corrected him that Miss Anderson was not "behind the partition wall", she was in another room, and that she was a reliable public official with access to top secrets.Senator Charles Toby, R-New Hampshire, called for the hearing to end as Bradley testified. “My impression is that much of the activity going on here is futile, and it is.” Toby sees the hearing as a waste of time:

There are a lot of... people with plots here, they have no military literacy and temperament... come here to ask various questions to those who have served the military for life. ...We publish so many press releases in the newspapers that the whole country is full of storms.Mr. Stalin subscribes every day... Why did we come here?Many of the questions we ask are extremely, extremely boring. ...

After the hearing is over, MacArthur will still lose his post, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will still be in charge of military aircraft, and troops will still fight in North Korea.Toby hopes to "ring the bell and bring down the curtain".

(End of this chapter)