October 4th, Saturday.

Autumn in Paris remains mild.

The gardens outside the Élysée Palace were meticulously manicured, yet a few newly withered leaves still managed to roll across the lawn and along the stone path.

Over the past 24 hours, the financial system across Europe has continued to deteriorate at a stifling pace.

By this point, even the European bureaucrats who were usually most adept at marathon negotiations in the corridors of Brussels, exhausting each other with procedures, terms, and rhetoric, had to admit a fact.

They ran out of time.

On Thursday evening, the French presidential palace extended formal invitations to Berlin, London, and Rome, proposing an emergency summit of leaders of Europe's four largest economies to be held in Paris on Saturday.

Even though people have some reservations about Sarkozy's recent performance, almost no one objects, because others are genuinely starting to feel afraid.

Merkel's response on the phone was as concise as ever.

"Okay. But we need to come up with something concrete by Saturday night. Let's not have another meeting that's all principles."

Brown was more direct.

Send me the time, location, and agenda. We'll be there.

Berlusconi even had the mood to joke.

"Nicolas, you've finally found something that everyone agrees on."

So, on a Saturday morning that was normally reserved for family dinners, football matches, and weekend newspapers, the leaders of France, Germany, Britain, and Italy, along with their finance ministers, central bank officials, the President of the European Commission, and the President of the Eurogroup, sat together in the Oval Meeting Room of the Élysée Palace, a room with gilded wainscoting and 18th-century paintings.

The table was piled high with documents prepared overnight by the French side.

Some of the drafts have been revised two or three times.

Sarkozy sat at one end of the long table.

He wore a dark blue suit and a white shirt, the collar buttoned up neatly. A speech was spread out in front of him, but he hardly looked down.

His gaze swept across the faces of everyone at the table.

"We are sitting here today not to issue a statement, nor to show the media any so-called unity."

He spoke a little slower than usual, but every pause seemed to be deliberately calculated.

"We are sitting here because we all know that if Europe cannot present a clear, credible, and coordinated position to the markets in the next 48 hours, then Monday morning we may be facing another disaster."

He paused after he finished speaking, but no one in the conference room responded.

Sarkozy then continued.

"So let's start with the most pressing issue."

"What should we do if another bank runs into trouble on Monday?"

Merkel looked up, but instead of answering, she asked:

Which bank?

Sarkozy frowned slightly.

"Angela, I don't know which one it is. That's the problem."

"But this is important, Nicolas."

Merkel's tone was not loud, but it carried an almost interrogative precision.

"Is it a liquidity problem or a capital problem? Is it an isolated institution or a systemic contagion? If we can't even distinguish this clearly, how can we start making commitments—"

"Both will be there."

Brown interrupted her.

Merkel turned to the British Prime Minister.

"I know there will be both, Gordon."

She did not raise her voice because she was interrupted.

"What I mean is, before the government takes any measures, it must at least know what problem it is trying to solve. Otherwise, we will use the wrong tools, waste taxpayers' money, and ultimately solve nothing."

She spoke calmly, but everyone present understood what her words truly referred to.

If you don't even understand what the problem is, it's impossible to get German taxpayers to pay first.

Brown leaned back in his chair, picked up his water glass, and took a sip.

"The problem is, Angela, sometimes you don't have time to make perfect distinctions."

He put down the cup.

"Back in Northern Rock, we could certainly sit down and have a three-day meeting to discuss the difference between liquidity and capital. But when depositors started lining up at the bank to withdraw their money, the nature of the problem changed."

"The government only has a few hours left."

"To protect, or not to protect?"

"We chose to protect."

He paused for a moment.

"But the problems now are much bigger than those in North Rock."

"It's no longer just a matter of depositors at one bank distrusting that bank. Now, banks distrust each other. They'd rather lock their money up with the central bank than lend it to their peers."

"This is not a problem with just one bank."

"This is a problem for the entire interbank market."

No one interrupted him; at least at this table, Britain was indeed one of the countries most qualified to say that.

They have already bailed out banks with real money and have witnessed firsthand what it's like when depositors line up to withdraw their funds.

In times of crisis, experience itself becomes a form of authority.

Trichet finally raised his head.

The president of the European Central Bank always speaks with an almost academic precision, as if every word must first undergo a legal and technical review in his mind.

"To be precise, the current tension in the interbank market is extremely severe. The overnight interbank lending spread is at a completely abnormal level."

"Yes," Brown said.

"But I must emphasize again,"

Trichet went on to say, "The European Central Bank is providing liquidity, and a lot of it."

"Our regular operations have expanded several times over. At the same time, we have also initiated dollar swap arrangements with the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the Swiss National Bank."

"Well," Sarkozy gestured, "nobody's saying the ECB did nothing."

Trichet glanced at him.

"I just want this to be very clear."

His expression remained unchanged.

"Because it is technically inaccurate to simply attribute all the problems to 'insufficient liquidity'."

As he spoke, he turned his gaze to several finance ministers.

"Some problems cannot be solved simply by the central bank increasing liquidity."

"If a bank's capital has been eroded to a dangerous level by losses, then giving it more short-term funds will only postpone the time when the problem comes to light."

The meaning is clear enough: the central bank can inject liquidity into the market, maintain the payment system, and provide banks with temporary funding.

But it cannot fill the hole in the government's capital.

That's fiscal policy.

It is the politicians' responsibility.

Merkel nodded slightly.

"That's exactly what I was saying."

Sarkozy glanced at the documents in front of him and brought the topic back to the draft.

"Okay. Let's write it down clearly."

"Central banks are responsible for liquidity. Governments support their banks when necessary."

"No."

Merkel's answer was delivered almost without pause.

Sarkozy looked up, a hint of impatience flashing in his eyes.

Why?

"Because it can't be written like that."

Merkel reached out and tapped the documents on the table.

"The term 'government-supported banks' is too broad."

"Which bank? What are the terms? Who will ultimately bear the losses?"

"I will not sign any document containing such wording if these questions are not answered."

Her logic is not complicated.

A statement of principles can be written in a grand style, filled with themes of unity, stability, and responsibility.

However, if any one of the statements could be interpreted by the market, the media, or other member states as "Germany is willing to bail out all European banks," then that statement cannot exist.

Sarkozy stared at her.

"So, what's your suggestion for writing it?"

Merkel glanced down at her notes.

"Governments will take necessary measures to maintain the stability of the financial system."

"The issue of specific institutions shall be handled by each country in accordance with its own legal framework and system."

She looked up.

"And it must be stated that if public funds are used, shareholders and management cannot be protected without compensation."

Junkers nodded.

"The private sector must share the losses."

"Otherwise, the message we're sending is that we can take any risks, because the government will always come to clean up the mess in the end."

"Yes," Merkel said.

Sarkozy leaned back in his chair.

"I don't object to this principle."

"I know."

Merkel looked at him.

"So I wrote it in."

In a corner of the conference room, staff from the French Ministry of Finance and the Presidential Palace immediately lowered their heads to revise the draft.

The soft clatter of keyboard keys echoed.

Barroso then steered the conversation toward another equally dangerous issue.

"But simply writing 'each country handles it according to its own system' is not enough."

Sarkozy turned his head to the side. "You're talking about Ireland."

"Ireland, of course."

A few days ago, the Irish government did something that shocked the whole of Europe.

It unilaterally announced that it would provide state guarantees for deposits in the country's major banks and a considerable range of debts.

There was no prior coordination with other EU member states, nor was there a wait for Brussels to reach a unified plan.

The effects were almost immediate.

Overnight, Irish banks gained an advantage that other European banks did not have:

Full endorsement of national credit.

But that's precisely where the problem lies.

If deposits at an Irish bank are fully guaranteed by the state, while those at German, British, or French banks offer less protection, why would depositors choose to leave their money there?

In a common market, capital can flow freely.

Fear is the same.

"That's the problem," Merkel said.

Brown flipped through the documents.

"They guarantee all deposits, and there is no minimum guarantee in the usual sense."

"It's not just deposits," Barroso added. "The guarantee also covers a significant portion of debt instruments."

He looked around at the crowd.

"If a bank gains a significant competitive advantage because its government provides extremely broad state guarantees, then funds will move."

"This is not a theoretical problem."

"In a single market where capital flows freely, money will choose the safest place on its own."

Sarkozy tapped on the table.

"But the Irishman's answer was also very simple."

"If they don't do this, the bank could have problems Monday morning."

"They would say it's self-preservation."

"I completely understand why they did that."

Merkel's voice was even colder than before.

"But understanding the motivation is not the same as accepting the outcome."

She paused for a moment.

"If every country suddenly changes its guarantee system during a crisis without notifying its partners in advance, then other countries will be forced to follow suit in order to prevent the outflow of deposits—"

"That's not coordination."

That's called competition.

She paused for a moment.

"A competition to see who can offer more generous national commitments."

Juncker gave a wry smile. "A race for national credit."

There was a moment of silence in the conference room.

This is the last thing the EU wants to see.

When the crisis truly arrives, each member state retreats back into the shell of its nation-state, using its own financial capacity to build walls for its own financial institutions.

If this competition continues, those countries with stronger fiscal capacity and higher sovereign credit will inevitably gain the upper hand.

First and foremost is Germany, but ironically, Germany is the least willing to participate in this kind of game.

Because once the rule becomes "whoever has stronger national credit provides more guarantees," then sooner or later everyone's attention will turn to Berlin.

Merkel clearly knew this as well.

"This cannot continue."

Barroso nodded.

"Therefore, the committee needs to have serious discussions with Dublin."

"We can talk," Sarkozy said immediately, "but I don't want today's meeting to turn into a meeting that openly criticizes Ireland."

His considerations are not hard to understand. The summit is not over yet. If the media gets the impression that European countries are blaming each other, then the headlines the next day will not be "Europe coordinates bailout".

Instead, it will be:

Europe is divided.

Merkel glanced at him.

"I did not ask to publicly criticize anyone."

"I know."

"I'm just asking that we agree on a clear principle in this room."

She said, word by word:

"No measure taken by any member state should intentionally or in fact shift the problem to other member states."

Barroso nodded.

"This can be included in the statement."

"The reconciliation standards for deposit guarantees must also be addressed as soon as possible," Brown said.

"Yes."

Sarkozy looked at Barroso.

"Can we decide on a unified standard today?"

Barroso shook his head.

"Impossible today."

"This requires approval from the parliaments of member states and also involves the existing legal frameworks of each country."

"We can determine the direction today, but it's impossible to decide on a specific number applicable across Europe in just a few hours."

"it is good."

Sarkozy did not press the matter further.

"Then the statement shouldn't make it sound like we've already resolved this issue today."

A brief silence fell over the table.

Sarkozy turned to Merkel. "And the fund."

Merkel did not speak immediately; a few seconds later, she raised her head.

"What fund?"

Sarkozy looked at her and smiled.

"Angela".

Merkel certainly knew what he was talking about.

They just don't want to take the initiative to admit that the issue is worth discussing.

"If you're referring to the 'European bailout fund' that the media has been reporting on recently," she finally said, "then I've already publicly stated Germany's position in Berlin."

"I don't think we should establish a fund now that is jointly funded by all member states and bears the losses of banks uniformly."

This time, even the French delegation did not respond immediately.

Germany's opposition is not to the phrase "European cooperation".

It opposes the collaboration ultimately becoming an unlimited bill.

A so-called common fund, which sounds like a way for Europe to jointly address the crisis.

But where will the money come from?

Who pays the most?

Who will it be used to save next?

As long as these questions remain unanswered, Berlin will not see "unity".

It would only be an unauthorized joint liability.

Sarkozy leaned forward.

"But we can't let the reporters come to the conclusion after the meeting that Europe spent half a day meeting and ended up with nothing concrete."

This is where his real anxiety lies.

If the final outcome consists of only a one-page statement filled with "principles," "cooperation," "coordination," and "commitments," then for a rotating chair country hoping to demonstrate its ability to act in the market, it is almost a failure.

He needs an action that the media can spot at a glance.

Merkel remained unmoved.

"Europe can have common principles."

"This does not mean that Europe must have a common funding pool."

"The market will ask, where is the money?" Sarkozy retorted.

"The money is in the member states."

Sarkozy spread his hands.

"That's the problem."

"No."

Merkel looked at him.

"This is the reality of the system."

"France has its budget, Germany has its budget, and Britain has its budget."

"The European Commission does not have a budget sufficient to restructure the entire European banking system."

"We cannot pretend it exists today."

She made it extremely clear.

A crisis cannot automatically create a European center of fiscal power that did not exist before.

At least Germany would not tacitly accept its birth at such a meeting.

Sarkozy leaned back.

"So, if a multinational bank runs into trouble—the bank is European, but the money still belongs to the country."

His words were barbed.

The single market is European.

Capital flows are European.

Banking operations cross national borders.

But when it comes to actually spending money, all countries immediately revert to their fiscal sovereignty.

Merkel did not shy away from the irony.

"Yes, within the current treaty framework."

Junkers chuckled.

"And once a bank really runs into trouble, the first question everyone always asks is—"

"What country is this bank from?"

No one objected.

For Luxembourg, the issue is even somewhat brutal.

It is one of the most important financial centers in Europe, yet its banking system is far larger than its own economy.

If a large-scale systemic crisis were to occur, Luxembourg would not be able to resolve it on its own financial resources alone.

Therefore, Juncker naturally hopes for stronger coordination at the European level.

Small countries simply lack the political weight of France and cannot package such demands into a grand European plan like Sarkozy did.

Barroso then picked up the conversation.

"That's why coordination at the European level must be further strengthened."

"We cannot continue to let countries figure things out on their own and then step on each other's toes."

"I've always agreed to coordination."

Merkel raised her pen.

"What I disagree with is the automatic translation of 'coordination' as 'shared liability'."

These two words have never been the same in the German political context.

Coordination means exchanging information, unifying rules, and avoiding undermining policy effectiveness.

Joint debt, however, means another problem:

Who pays for whom?

Brown finally started to get impatient.

"I think this issue has been going on for long enough."

His tone wasn't directed at Merkel, but rather at a weariness with the debate that was gradually sliding into institutional philosophy.

"The market doesn't care whether we have a European Treasury right now."

"We don't."

"It won't suddenly appear on Monday morning."

He rested his hands on the table.

"The market is concerned with something else."

"Are banks still able to provide financing?"

"If banks are unwilling to lend money to each other, the central bank can provide liquidity."

"But if the market still believes these banks could collapse at any time, things won't end there."

"The government must be prepared to take action."

Merkel immediately asked, "What action?"

"It depends on the situation."

Brown didn't hesitate. "It could be a liquidity guarantee, or it could be a debt guarantee."

He paused for a moment after saying this.

"If necessary—it could also be capital."

Sarkozy raised his eyebrows.

"capital?"

"I said, if necessary."

Merkel's gaze suddenly sharpened. "The government is directly injecting capital into banks?"

"I didn't say every bank needs it."

"I'm just confirming what you mean, Gordon."

Brown looked at her. "I mean, we can't rule out any tools beforehand."

"Sometimes, the cheapest way is not to endlessly provide short-term liquidity to an undercapitalized bank, but to solve its capital problem once and for all."

There was a moment of silence around the conference table.

The British government was indeed secretly preparing an extremely radical plan at this time:

The government directly used public funds to purchase bank shares, replenishing the capital of institutions such as the Royal Bank of Scotland.

But Brown won't reveal all their cards here; they're not entirely sure yet.

And once the UK explicitly announces its readiness to inject capital, the other countries at the table will immediately be forced to answer the same question:

Are you going to join or not?

Trichet nodded slightly.

I completely agree with that.

"Liquidity support and capital restructuring must be strictly distinguished."

"They are two completely different types of intervention."

Sarkozy looked at Brown.

"So, is Britain considering some kind of capital injection scheme?"

Brown paused for two seconds.

"We are considering all tools that can effectively restore market confidence and financial stability."

A diplomatic phrase so standard it's almost flawless.

They neither acknowledged it nor admitted it.

There was no denial.

Sarkozy stared at him for a moment, but ultimately did not press the matter further.

The meeting then turned to another, more technical, but equally politically risky, issue.

Accounting rules.

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