About two hours later, Lu Ze received a standard master agreement for Total Return Swap (TRS) drafted by Morgan Stanley's institutional brokerage department and preliminarily reviewed by the law firm. He glanced through it, thinking about the ingenious use of this tool.

In a sense, if you're a time traveler and can do TRS with investment banks, then it's practically a perfect tool for going long.

It can provide five or even ten times leverage, and once the Fed implements zero interest rates in the future, Lu Ze can keep interest rates extremely low. Thus, five billion can be used to buy large assets like Apple or Google, effectively amounting to tens of billions.

The only thing to watch out for is not getting wiped out by a short-term drop.

Thinking this, Lu Ze closed the file and opened several other stacks of company documents.

For Lu Ze, this Friday was no different from any other day; it was a quiet and unremarkable day.

But in Washington, D.C., more than 200 miles away, these days will probably be the noisiest, most bustling, and also the most bizarre days of the year.

Because the largest, most centralized, and most desperate physical aggregation in the history of the modern financial system is silently unfolding in a few blocks between Constitution Avenue and Pennsylvania Avenue in the District of Columbia.

Every October, the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank bring together people from all over the world who manage money in Washington, D.C.

The headquarters of the two institutions are located on opposite sides of 19th Street, and the area of ​​a few blocks in between will become the physical center of global financial power this week.

Finance ministers, central bank governors, deputies, and technical teams from more than 180 member countries, along with the annual general meeting of the Institute of International Finance (IIF), an industry organization of the world's largest banks, insurance companies, asset management firms, and sovereign wealth funds, converged in the same neighborhood.

Formal agendas are usually dull. One plenary session, committee meeting, and press conference after another, speeches are prepared in advance, and the wording is deliberated by the delegations of each country more than a dozen times, finally forming a communiqué that no one will object to, but no one will seriously implement.

The real substance is never on the agenda.

It's in the suites of the Willard Hotel and the Four Seasons Hotel, in the 45-minute window of bilateral talks, and in the two-minute chat during seating changes at dinner parties.

A finance minister spends four days in Washington, with 30% of the time on official business and the remaining 70% on networking – five or six closed-door meetings a day, shaking hands, exchanging assessments, and getting to know each other with counterparts from more than a dozen countries and heads of dozens of large institutions.

At previous annual meetings, these people who control the global liquidity gates usually wore impeccably tailored suits, sipped champagne in the ballrooms of the Westin or Ritz-Carlton, and discussed poverty reduction, currency fine-tuning, and multilateral trade agreements in obscure and elegant diplomatic language.

Unfortunately, on this Friday in October 2008, no one was in the mood to touch those expensive sparkling wines.

......

In a conference room on the third floor of the Ministry of Finance's main building, the curtains were half drawn, and two Secret Service agents stood guard on either side with expressionless faces.

The heavy mahogany double doors were tightly closed, completely shutting out the hurried footsteps of leather shoes in the corridor.

The G7 finance ministers and central bank governors meeting began at 2 p.m.

Hank Paulson sat at one end of the long table, a prepared list of key points spread out in front of him. He hadn't slept at least six hours in days; there were two very obvious shadows under his eyes.

Sitting next to him was Ben Bernanke. Below him were the finance ministers, central bank governors, and their deputies from the seven countries. The nameplates, bottled water, and notebooks on the table were neatly arranged, much like at every G7 meeting over the past twenty years.

But this time, everyone's face was filled with a solemn and worried expression.

Typically, the first half hour of such meetings is used for each country to take turns presenting their domestic economic situation. It's a formality; everyone listens while reviewing their own documents.

Today's ceremony did not proceed as planned because everyone knew it was meaningless.

The first to speak was British Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling.

He didn't read from a prepared statement, but looked around the room before beginning his remarks with, "We already did it on Monday. I think everyone here has seen the market's reaction."

He then reiterated the three components of the British plan: liquidity support, capital restructuring, and guarantees for sterling debt.

"I must say frankly,"

Darlin looked in Paulson's direction.

"The UK made the decision to inject capital, a decision that is extremely unpopular domestically. And the problem now is that if only one country in the G7 does this, the funds will simply flow to us from elsewhere, or conversely, we will be seen by everyone as the only country that admits its banks can't hold on."

He paused to emphasize.

"I don't want either of these outcomes to happen."

Everyone at the table understood what he meant.

The British are asking: Are you going to join or not?

For the next forty minutes, the meeting completely deviated from the agenda.

German Finance Minister Per Steinbrück said that Germany is dealing with Hypo and considering a national bank stabilization fund, but he must remind those present that Germany's federal structure and savings bank system mean that Germany cannot simply copy the British approach.

He then raised an even more pointed question.

"If Britain provides state guarantees for new bank debt, while Germany does not," Steinbrück adjusted his glasses, "will German banks still be able to borrow money in the wholesale funding market next week?"

No one answered, because the answer was obvious.

Once a country provides a sovereign guarantee for the debt of its banks, then all banks in unguaranteed countries will immediately be repriced in the financing market—because they have no country backing them up, and the risk naturally increases.

This is the contagious nature of guarantees. It's not a policy of one country, but a competition in which everyone is forced to participate.

French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde then spoke. She mentioned the Irish government's decision to provide an indefinite, unlimited state guarantee for all deposits and debts of its six banks, amounting to more than twice Ireland's GDP.

This decision sparked enormous anger within Europe because it drew deposits from other countries to Dublin overnight.

"We need a common framework."

Lagarde said, "Otherwise, every single decision will hurt everyone else."

However, this obviously presents some problems, because the political and economic environments of different countries are very different, so whether or not a guarantee can be provided, and how to provide such a guarantee, is not an easy thing to coordinate.

Representatives from Japan and Canada remained relatively silent. The Italian finance minister offered a brief, principled suggestion regarding coordination.

Then, Darlin asked a second question.

This question was directed at Paulson, and it was asked very directly.

"Hank, I want you to clarify one thing. After Lehman Brothers, will the U.S. government allow any systemically important financial institution to fail?"

The meeting room was silent for a few seconds.

Paulson put down his pen.

He knew this question would inevitably be asked.

Since Thursday afternoon, four people have asked him the same question in different ways. Some disguised it as a technical inquiry, others as concerns about market expectations, but Darlin was the most direct.

Lehman Brothers was just one example; to be precise, they were asking:

Where exactly are the bottom lines of the US government, and are you capable of fulfilling your promises?

Three weeks after Lehman Brothers collapsed, all credit pricing models worldwide added a new variable—the uncertainty of government bailouts.

And this variable was added by the United States itself on that morning in September.

"We will not allow another systemically important institution to fall in that way," Paulson said.

He chose his words carefully. He didn't say "I won't let any institution go down," he said "not in that way."

"But I must also make this clear,"

He went on to say, "During that week in September, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve did not have the legal tools to stop it. We had no solution, no authority to inject capital into a non-bank institution, and we could not find any buyer willing to take it over."

Paulson glanced at Darling. If Britain hadn't blocked Barclays' takeover bid back then, things might have been different.

"So it wasn't a choice, it was a situation with no options."

"And now?" Darlin ignored his little glance.

"Congress has now authorized $700 billion."

"What will be done with that money?"

This was the real issue this afternoon, and the one Paulson was repeatedly asked over the next thirty minutes.

Europeans wanted to know very specific things: would the United States, like Britain, directly inject that $700 billion into banks to acquire equity?

Paulson did not give a direct answer.

"The bill grants the Treasury Department broad statutory authority. Purchasing troubled assets is fundamental, but it does not preclude any necessary measures to restore market confidence. We will act at the most appropriate time and in the most appropriate manner, based on the specific needs of the U.S. financial system."

Paulson leaned back in his high-backed chair, his hands clasped together, his face displaying an unyielding, cold expression.

He concluded that he would not announce any decisions made internationally without following domestic procedures before the final plan was finalized.

This is a classic example of official platitudes.

Darlin sighed and leaned back in his chair; Steinbrück shook his head and made a mark in his notebook; Lagarde stared at Paulson scrutinizingly for a few seconds before finally looking away.

Bernanke added a few technical comments about liquidity tools next to him, temporarily diverting the topic a little.

The meeting ended at 5:15 p.m., forty minutes later than scheduled.

The seven countries eventually agreed on a framework for a five-point action plan: to take all necessary measures to support systemically important institutions, to unfreeze credit and money markets, to ensure banks have access to adequate capital, to protect depositors, and to restart the secondary market for mortgage loans.

The communiqué was unusually brief and abandoned almost all the habitual diplomatic language found in G7 communiqués. There were no "we note" or "we encourage," only "we will take all necessary measures."

People did not disperse immediately after the meeting ended.

These are the most efficient fifteen minutes in this situation.

The official recording was closed, the translators and recorders were packing up, and those at the table who actually wanted to talk began to approach each other in a seemingly completely casual manner.

Paulson stood up, tucked the folder under his arm, and was about to walk towards the door when Lagarde called him back.

Her opening remarks were a polite one, and a frank assessment of the meeting's atmosphere. She then spoke of France's preparations for a European coordination program and the need for a broader summit.

Then, after a very natural transition, she brought up something else.

"Hank, regarding the transparency issue in the over-the-counter derivatives market,"

Her tone remained unchanged.

"I know this isn't the topic for today. But there's one thing I'd like to ask—will anyone from Farstar Capital be attending the Institute of International Finance's general meeting this time?"

Paulson's hand stopped on the folder.

"I don't know."

He added, "The IIF's membership list and agenda are determined by themselves, and the Ministry of Finance does not get involved."

"certainly."

Lagarde nodded. "I just thought that if there were an opportunity to have some market participants and regulators exchange views on the settlement of derivatives in an informal setting, it might be beneficial for both sides."

She paused for half a second.

"Do you think Mr. Walker would consider attending if the invitation were extended in this manner?"

I cannot answer that question.

Paulson's expression remained unchanged. "I know nothing about his schedule."

"I understand."

Lagarde smiled. "I just thought that, given your position, if you find this conversation valuable, perhaps you could pass it on."

"Mr. Walker is a completely independent market participant."

Paulson said, "The Treasury Department has no influence over his schedule, nor should it."

Lagarde looked at him for two seconds, then changed the subject and started talking about her weekend plans.

As Paulson walked out of the conference room, he squinted and pondered the conversation in his mind.

What the French want is not just dialogue. They probably want to know more about the relationship between the man who caused four European banks to lose tens of billions of dollars in a single day and then dismantled Sarkozy's entire narrative with a 500-word statement, and the US Treasury Department.

Lagarde's statement, "In your capacity, perhaps I could pass on a message," was the only real question in the entire conversation.

She was testing whether he had that ability.

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