Investment Banking Path

Chapter 67 In the Financial World

Chapter 67 In the Financial World

During her high school years, Wang Muxue only knew that the 2008 global financial crisis was caused by a group of investment bank managers who liked to "package" investments and a bunch of mindless investors who loved to buy "AAA" stocks.

But after her undergraduate and graduate studies, she also realized that things were not so simple.

Every major and serious event in the world is caused by a combination of factors.

The factors that led to that crisis included the US government's inappropriate real estate financial policies, the "abuse" of financial derivatives, the unreasonable equity incentive structure of financial institutions, and the Federal Reserve's (hereinafter referred to as "the Fed") aggressively tightening monetary policy.

Crisis is always just a symptom; greed is the essence of everything.

For example, Lehman Brothers, as a world-class investment bank, should have been world-class in its research and innovation capabilities for financial products.

Being at the center of a risk storm, Lehman Brothers should have understood the importance of risk management better than any other company.

However, it ultimately could not escape the fate of collapsing. The reason was that Lehman Brothers' management and employees held about one-third of the company's stock, which led everyone to only know how to speculate and make money, and to work hard to sell their shares at a high price soon. They had no time to consider the company's potential risks and long-term interests.

再比如2000年前后,美国网际网路泡沫破灭,从2001年1月至2003年6月,美联储连续13次下调联邦基金利率,致使利率从6.5%狂降至1%的历史最低水平。

Extremely low bank deposit interest rates mean that money in banks is not worth much, so most Americans will naturally take their money out of the bank as soon as possible to find more valuable investments; and the banks themselves will also feel that money is not worth much, so they will quickly loosen their lending policies, lend to more businesses and more individuals, and lend money out to make money as soon as possible.

For example, a bank might lend money to a street sweeper or a thug who's been fighting. These people might have very poor financial conditions and bad credit, and they simply wouldn't be able to afford a house. But the bank turns a blind eye and lends money anyway, thinking that since the house is in their hands, they can pay back as much as they can afford, and if they really can't afford it, they'll sell the house.

This bank policy directly led to most poor people suddenly being able to buy houses, further fueling the housing bubble in the United States at the time.

It must be said that this monetary policy of the Federal Reserve will also induce a certain expectation among investors in the market, which is:

Since the government intervened to rescue the market during the dot-com bubble, it will definitely intervene again even if there is a real estate bubble now. So let's keep going! Housing prices won't fall!

At the time, the entire Wall Street community, with the mindset that they had the government as their backer, was breathing in the atmosphere of enthusiastic speculation, and was letting the snowball carrying the atomic bomb grow bigger and bigger.

However, the Federal Reserve has already loosened monetary policy so much, it will definitely have to tighten it, otherwise it will not be conducive to the long-term sustainable development of the entire US economy.

The tightening of monetary policy means that the Federal Reserve gradually withdraws funds from the market by raising the reserve requirement ratio.

This process was undoubtedly a fuse that detonated an atomic bomb. The government had released a large amount of cash, and we were doing very well. Look, the housing prices have risen from 100 million to 320 million. Now you suddenly want to take the money back. How are we supposed to play?

With cash flow deteriorating, it's obviously impossible to continue playing the game. Because no one on the market has the money to buy your 320 million yuan house, you have no choice but to lower the price with a heavy heart, raising your bids: 280 million, 260 million, 220 million, 150 million, 90…

Holy crap, still nobody's buying!

Then the atomic bomb exploded, the real estate bubble finally burst, housing prices plummeted like crazy, the value of assets held by banks shrank dramatically, and various securitized products with such assets as underlying assets began to default on a large scale. The direct cause of the defaults was that the cash flow that investors had originally bought, which represented future cash flow, stopped coming in!

Why can't it flow in?!

Because mortgage slaves aren't stupid. I borrowed 100 million from the bank to buy a house, and now its market value keeps shrinking. Last weekend, after going to church, it was worth 99. This Tuesday, after playing tennis with a classmate, it was only worth 90. By Thursday, it was only worth 80. Now, the bank wants me to pay a 80 million mortgage on a house that's only worth 100. I'm not doing that! I'd rather not live there anymore. The bank can take the house if they want!

It's not scary if one person thinks this way; what's scary is if everyone thinks this way.

When mortgage holders start defaulting on their loans, banks' cash flow deteriorates or even dries up. Banks cannot operate without liquidity, so in order to survive, they have no choice but to sell properties. However, they discover that other banks are also selling, leading to a massive sell-off of real estate. This causes a severe oversupply and a further plunge in property prices. At this point, the vicious cycle that leads to the financial crisis officially begins.

When the crisis hit, commercial banks were devastated, and investment banks' securitized products based on the cash flow generated by such properties also defaulted one after another, with prices plummeting. As a result, investment banks also broke down in tears...

The insurance company, which had been enjoying dividing the cake, was shocked and kept losing money until it couldn't even tell its own parents from its losses.

The above process was caused by the continuous tightening of monetary policy, the bursting of the real estate bubble, and the continuous rise in the default rate of various packaged securitized products, which triggered a wave of defaults that swept through all financial institutions eager to make money and ambitious.

The topic of Cao Pingsheng's PPT, "Asset Securitization," undoubtedly evoked Wang Muxue's memories of the previous global financial crisis.

That crisis taught Wang Muxue that the world of finance is both magnificent and cruel.

In this world, there is never the smoke of gunpowder, no army, no aircraft carriers or fighter jets, but it can make the assets of millions of households evaporate into thin air, make hardworking people suddenly lose their jobs, severely damage honest businesses, and cause a country's thriving economy to rapidly decline.

Wang Muxue now understands that all of this cannot be attributed to "asset securitization," but rather to "excessive asset securitization."

In essence, asset securitization is a process of risk transfer and diversification, distributing the risks faced by the originator to numerous investors.

Many US asset securitizations involve two or more securitizations, resulting in too many tranches of securities and the use of derivatives such as credit default swaps (CDS), making asset securitization products overly complex and difficult for investors to understand the risks involved.

The problem in the United States is that its investment banks, which have been developing for over a century, have become too adept at manipulation, to the point of over-abusing asset securitization as a financial instrument.

Wang Muxue, who had studied in the United States for many years, was not very familiar with the development of asset securitization in China, so she quickly connected to her mobile hotspot and frantically searched for information on the high-speed train.

It's surprising to learn that my country's securities market is too young. Investment banks have almost no idea how to use "asset securitization," a weapon of mass destruction. It's a bit like new recruits who can be stunned and dumbfounded for a long time when they see a real nuclear bomb.

my country's asset securitization began in 2005, and after more than nine years of pilot practice, it has gone through a development process from scratch.

Although the types of asset securitization have become increasingly diverse in recent years, and the relevant laws, accounting and tax systems have been continuously improved, and enterprises, investors and intermediaries have become more mature, the development level of asset securitization in my country is still very low and the scale is very small, which is far from meeting the needs of economic and financial development.

Wang Muxue frowned. This market was simply not mature enough...

(End of this chapter)

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