Rebirth: I am in Jin-Cha-Ji

You can't expect all Party members and cadres to be ascetics. At the beginning of the Liberation Era, countless Party cadres in their thirties were single and had delayed marriage due to the war. With the founding of the People's Republic of China, these individuals naturally had to address the major life events. However, after getting married and having children, household expenses increased rapidly. Living on the limited provisions of the supply system alone was not enough to provide for a comfortable life.

Of course, it’s not that I can’t afford to eat or wear clothes, but when I compare myself to others, I feel like my life is not as good as it could be.

This kind of resentment is huge.

The more resentment accumulates, the more likely they will vent it elsewhere. Therefore, this kind of conflict cannot be accumulated for a long time.

Fortunately, the classification was finally successful.

Of course, the National Organization Committee cannot determine the grades of senior cadres. For example, cadres above administrative level 6 or 7 are considered senior Party cadres. The Organization Committee can only generally set standards. The Organization Committee cannot determine the grades of specific cadres; many decisions require the Secretariat or even the Central Committee to make them.

There are even many senior officials who need to report themselves.

Especially the spouses of central leaders.

Many of them were cadres who had participated in the revolution for many years, but because their spouses were central leaders, their rank was a major issue. The spouses of central leaders often reported lower ranks when their rank was determined, fearing it would affect their husbands' reputations.

This time, eight individuals were classified as Administrative Level 1. Seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee, plus Song Qingling, were classified as Administrative Level 1. Next up, Administrative Level 2, were most Politburo members, as well as many democrats like Li Jishen.

Of course, this does not mean that all Politburo members are at the second level of administration.

For example, General He and Rao Shushi, who have just entered the Politburo, are both at the third administrative level.

However, some individuals' administrative ranks have risen. For example, Zhang Dingcheng. The central government was preparing to nominate him for the position of Procurator-General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, so his rank needed to be adjusted. Zhang Dingcheng was one of the pioneers of the Fujian-Xi Soviet Area. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he served as the Fourth Secretary of the East China Bureau and Deputy Director of the National Organization Committee. He was originally designated as administrative level four, but the Procurator-General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate is administrative level two. However, Zhang Dingcheng didn't qualify for administrative level two, so the central government decided to assign him administrative level three.

Luo Shuai is different.

Luo Shuai, who left his position as Procurator General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, returned to the military, serving as Director of the General Political Department and Head of the General Cadre Department. This position would normally place him at the third administrative level in the military, but because he previously served as Procurator General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate and is currently a member of the Political Bureau, his rank is classified as second administrative level. Among cadres of his rank, Luo Shuai's administrative rank is relatively high.

The wage system is not just an executive-level decision.

For example, cadres like Wei Hongjun, in addition to their administrative salary, also receive military service allowances and local subsidies. Of course, Wei Hongjun won't receive the military service allowance, as it's only available to military cadres holding military posts. Historically, neither General Chen nor General He received a military service allowance.

Fourth: The Politburo decided to hold a grand awarding ceremony in 1953.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China, all aspects of the country were modeled after the Soviet Union. This included the military rank system, which was also intended to be modeled after the Soviet Union. When the National Organization Committee determined the ranks of local cadres nationwide, the General Political Department of the Central Military Commission also determined the ranks of military cadres nationwide.

Luo Shuai, the Minister of the General Political Department, is in charge of the grading work, but Luo Shuai is overwhelmed by this work.

Compared to the military, the military has more factions, more senior cadres, and more officers with distinguished military achievements. Furthermore, due to years of experience in war, the performance of cadres varies across different periods. One must comprehensively consider performance during the Agrarian Revolution, the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, and the War of Liberation, while also balancing factions. One cannot simply assign higher ranks to a particular faction simply because it has made significant contributions or has more personnel. One must consider all aspects of the factions and maintain a balanced relationship between them.

Why did the Central Committee choose Luo Shuai as the Minister of the General Political Department to be in charge of this matter?

This is because Luo Shuai is known for his fairness. He also has sufficient qualifications and status to make the classification. If it were someone else, even the slightest problem with the classification would likely lead to public criticism.

Even Coach Luo felt embarrassed.

It is not very difficult to grade some cadres.

For example, Xu Shiyou, commander of the Shandong Military Region, was the commander of the Fourth Front Army during the Red Army era, deputy commander of the 386th Brigade during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, and commander of the Jiaodong Military Region, a second-level military region under the Shandong Military Region. He was also the commander of the corps during the War of Liberation and is now the commander of the Shandong Military Region.

The classification is very easy, it is the corps level.

The levels during the Agrarian Revolution, the Anti-Japanese War, the Liberation War, and after liberation are all clear and do not require any consideration. Just position it at the corps level according to the current level.

The difficulties are two situations for cadres.

One type is a cadre who enjoyed extensive service and high rank during the Agrarian Revolution, but has subsequently declined in rank. Assigning this type of cadre a high rank is difficult. If you assign a high rank based on current circumstances, they will be dissatisfied, given their high rank and extensive service during their time in the Red Army. However, if you favor them, they will continue to decline, and their current rank is not high.

There are many such cadres.

A prime example is Xiao Zijing, currently serving as Deputy Director of the Military Training Department. He was once Deputy Commander of the Second Front Army, Deputy Commander of the 120th Division, and Commander of the Ji-Re-Liao Advance Army, yet now he's only a Deputy Director of the Military Training Department. If this position were graded accordingly, he'd be at the rank of Deputy Corps or Quasi-Corps. However, with Xiao Zijing's credentials, it's simply unacceptable to assign him that rank.

However, compared to this situation, there is another situation that is even more difficult: cadres who were of low rank during the Agrarian Revolution but rose rapidly during the Anti-Japanese War and the War of Liberation.

The former, despite their extensive experience, are currently on a downward spiral. However, the latter, despite their limited experience, are currently on an upward trajectory. Each of them holds a promising future, and therefore warrants careful attention.

Those who were most difficult to rank were from the Jin-Cha-Ji and Ji-Re-Cha Military Regions. Let's not even talk about Wei Hongjun, a second-tier administrative cadre, but Wang Qiuyun, who currently oversees the Central-South Military Region. He was a battalion-level cadre in the Red Army, a company-level cadre in the Eighth Route Army, and commander of the Jin-Cha-Ji Second-tier Military Region. During the Liberation War, he served as deputy commander of the Northeast Military Region and deputy commander of the Fourth Field Army. He currently oversees the Central-South Military Region, a first-tier military region.

How would you rate it?

Just look at the performance of school-level cadres during the Red Army period and the early days of the Anti-Japanese War. However, starting from the Anti-Japanese War, they took one step at a time and took off like a rocket.

Given the rank of Corps-level officer, what would happen to the many Corps-level officers under Wang Qiuyun? Not only was Wang Qiuyun unable to explain, but even the Northeast Military Region, the Fourth Field Army, and the Central-South Military Region were unable to explain.

You're the Deputy Commander of the Northeast Military Region, the Fourth Field Army, and the Central-South Military Region, and you're the Deputy Commander in charge of the Central-South Military Region. And yet you give him a rank of Corps-level? How disrespectful of the Northeast Military Region and the Fourth Field Army are you? If Wang Qiuyun were given a rank of Corps-level, what would become of the many cadres in the Northeast Military Region and the Fourth Field Army? Their ranks would be artificially lowered. Therefore, for their own benefit, they couldn't allow Wang Qiuyun's rank to be too low. Not to mention Wang Qiuyun's illustrious military achievements. Whether during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression or the War of Liberation, he was a nationally renowned general.

Of course, Wang Qiuyun is still easy to deal with, after all, his rank is high enough and his military achievements are great.

The grading was exceptional and no one else could say anything.

The most challenging personnel for the Hebei-Rehe-Chahar Military Region to rank are those currently at the corps level. For example, Wu Qinghe, commander of the Inner Mongolia Military Region, was a member of the 29th Army and joined the Eighth Route Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Lei Jiabin, former commander of the Chahar Military Region and current deputy commander of the Volunteer Army Logistics Command, as well as Huang Hao, commander of the Rehe Military Region, Gao Wei, commander of the Qinghai Military Region, and Feng Mulin, commander of the Anhui Military Region, were all low-ranking cadres during the Red Army era.

Can you assign them the rank of regular regiment?

Even at the deputy corps level, their qualifications were insufficient. But there was nothing they could do, given their current rank.

Then there's Zhang Zihua, the commander of the Southeast Military Region. He's a deputy commander of a major military region. He should at least be given the rank of a full corps commander. However, Zhang Zihua was only a deputy corps commander during his time in the Red Army.

Of course, the cadres from the Hebei-Rehe-Chahar Military Region have the most difficult situation.

This doesn't mean that cadres in other parts of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region were free of problems. This was especially true for those under Yang Quanwu's command. Yang Quanwu himself only became a division-level cadre in the Red Army in 1936, having previously served as a regimental commander. Yang Quanwu's qualifications were relatively low, and those under him were even less experienced.

Besides, Yang Quanwu had a group of cadres under his command who came from the Northeast Army, the 29th Army, and the Shanxi-Suiyuan Army.

Yang Quanwu commanded the 18th, 19th, and 21st Field Corps, plus hundreds of thousands of local troops and military commands. He had around thirty corps-level cadres. Many of the cadres who joined Yang Quanwu during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression were now corps-, army-, and division-level cadres.

How to rate?

It would definitely not be feasible to assign ranks based on their current positions. By then, there would be a lot of corps-level and deputy corps-level cadres. After all, during the Red Army era, these cadres were mostly regimental-level or below, and many even joined the Route Army during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.

But if you suppress them all.

The pressure behind this would also make General Luo feel awkward. After all, this involves the Jin-Cha-Ji region, the largest of the current factions. Furthermore, the Jin-Cha-Ji troops have a long history of military exploits, both during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the War of Liberation. Under such circumstances, a poor rank would lead to a lot of gossip. And Yang Quanwu's bad temper was also a headache for General Luo.

In order to determine the classification, Marshal Luo went to Marshal Nie and Yang Quanwu every day in 1951.

Marshal Nie agreed with Marshal Luo's rank assessment for many of the Jin-Cha-Ji cadres. There were so many corps-level cadres in Jin-Cha-Ji that it was impossible to assign them all full corps-level rank. For someone like Chen Kaikun, the former commander of the 1th Corps, to be given full corps-level rank was a gesture of respect due to his military achievements; after all, before the War of Resistance, his highest rank had been the commander of the 9st Red Army Regiment. However, some other corps-level cadres were too inexperienced to accept even a full corps-level rank. Therefore, Marshal Nie and Yang Quanwu both agreed to assign many of the following corps-level cadres to deputy corps-level rank. Many of the cadres currently holding deputy corps-level positions were assigned to quasi-corps-level rank. Basically, they would all be demoted by one level.

However, the ratings below this level cannot be lowered at will.

If you push down the ranks of some division-level cadres, it will affect their rank promotion. The same applies to corps-level cadres. If you push down their ranks, they'll be disadvantaged in future rank promotions. You can't let these corps-level cadres receive ranks lower than most division-level cadres.

Besides, there was a man named Huangfa in Jin-Cha-Ji who made a mistake while teaching at a military academy.

This was a distinguished general in the Jin-Cha-Ji War, Yang Quanwu's first brigade commander, column commander, and corps commander. If he had been rank-followed normally, he would have been a full-fledged corps-level cadre, and no one would have objected. However, Huang Fa had made mistakes and been demoted to a military academy, which made his rank difficult to assign. Yang Quanwu insisted that even if Huang Fa had made mistakes, they were not anti-Party or counter-revolutionary, and that excessive repression was not appropriate. He could be demoted to deputy corps-level. But Marshal Luo refused to agree.

It's because he has a high rank that he is a typical target of the central government.

And it was a mistake made in Beijing. If you had made a mistake in another city while traveling south, it might not have been so serious. But if you made a mistake in Beijing and it caused such a negative impact, then it's a huge problem.

The chairman knew that Huang Facheng was having affairs with both men and women.

Therefore, Luo Shuai’s opinion is that Huang Fa should be classified as quasi-corps level or army level.

This job is really difficult.

Marshal Luo began overseeing the rank classification in 1951, but the initial draft was only a rough draft. Furthermore, with the outbreak of the Korean War, the rank classification was subject to change. For example, Song Yulin, commander of the 71st Army, was deputy commander of the 20th Corps and concurrently commander of the 71st Army before his deployment to Korea. Based on Song Yulin's revolutionary history, he could be classified as a quasi-corps rank. However, Song Yulin fought with distinction in the Korean War, and upon his return to China, he was likely to serve as deputy commander of a military region. This would also lead to a change in his rank, possibly to deputy corps rank.

Including Zheng Weishan, who was originally rated as a deputy corps commander. However, he served as deputy commander of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army and fought so well in the Korean War, and also fought so well in the final stages of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the War of Liberation. It would be difficult to justify not giving him a full corps commander rank after his return.

It should be said that the first batch of volunteer troops who participated in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, the 13th Corps, the 20th Corps, and the 50th Army, achieved such glorious results that upon their return, the rank of many cadres had to be reconsidered.

Now that the Politburo has decided to award ranks in 1953, the grading process must be completed this year. Luo Shuai is overwhelmed, so he has applied to strengthen the General Personnel Department, hoping to assign him a few more deputy ministers to assist him in completing the grading process.

Fifth: The Military Commission must formulate a disarmament plan for 1953.

After the outbreak of the Korean War, 35% of China's fiscal revenue was spent on military spending, not counting weapons purchased with Soviet loans. If Soviet loans were included, the vast majority of New China's fiscal revenue went to the war effort. Fiscal pressure is now immense, with annual deficits. Undertaking Soviet-aided projects requires substantial funding. However, the central government's excessive investment in these industrial projects has directly led to fluctuations in previously stable domestic prices.

So the central government really can’t hold on.

If the war continues, the subsequent Soviet aid projects will be impossible to carry out. It is not the Soviet Union's fault, but China itself lacks the funds to carry out the project.

The United States was unable to sustain the war because of heavy casualties and prisoners.

But China has no money.

Therefore, the central government had already decided that disarmament and military spending must be reduced. The central government's plan was to reduce China's military spending to less than 1953% of fiscal revenue by 20, after the Korean War, and to around 1957% by 10. Only by significantly reducing military spending could fiscal pressure be alleviated.

But how to cut military spending?

At this stage, there is only one way, and that is disarmament.

Therefore, the Politburo meeting this time required the Military Commission to reduce the military by one million in 1953. Before the Ninth National Congress, that is, before 1957, another 150 million troops had to be reduced.

Of course, while disarming, the existing conscription system also needed to be changed. Both the Eighth Route Army and the People's Liberation Army employed a volunteer system, but this was a wartime practice. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the volunteer system was no longer consistent with military regularization, so it was replaced with a conscription system.

The Politburo ultimately decided that General Peng, General He, Marshal Lin, Marshal Luo, and Li Yu would be responsible for disarmament. They were to produce a 1953 disarmament plan as soon as possible and submit it to the Military Commission and the Politburo for discussion and approval.

The Politburo also mandated that some specialized units be transferred to other departments. For example, the Railway Public Security Force, previously under the Public Security Army, was transferred directly to the Railway Public Security Bureau. Furthermore, enterprise security departments, previously under the Public Security Command, were now being transferred to local public security bureaus or factory management.

The troops need to be downsized.

However, troop reduction is a very sensitive issue.

So many factions are unwilling to weaken their own strength and disband their troops. Therefore, how to complete the disarmament work and balance the various factions is not an easy task.

Marshal Lin, despite being a member of the Politburo and the Central Military Commission, remained largely inactive. He only occasionally attended Military Commission meetings to handle simple matters, spending the majority of his time recuperating. It can be said that during the four years since the founding of the People's Republic of China, despite holding a high position of power, he consistently used recuperation as a pretext for remaining inactive.

The same is true for this Politburo meeting.

There was much discussion about the Military Commission, but Marshal Lin did not express his views. Regarding the work of the Military Commission, it was mainly General Peng and General He who reported.

893 Central Military Commission Meeting

Sixth: This time the Politburo decided to completely abolish the local Central Bureaus and local administrative committees.

This included the Northeast, Northwest, Southwest, Central South, and East China Bureaus, as well as the South China and Southeast China branches under the Central South Bureau. From now on, the central government would directly lead all provinces.

However, because the Korean War had not yet ended, the Northeast Bureau and the Northeast Administrative Committee were temporarily retained. However, the Central Committee had already begun to transfer cadres from the Northeast Bureau and the Northeast Administrative Committee to Beijing.

Zhang Xiushan, Second Secretary of the Northeast Bureau and Chairman of the Northeast Administrative Committee, was promoted to First Deputy Minister of the Propaganda Department, replacing Lu Dingyi. Gao Gang's actions against the Propaganda Department severely affected both Lu Dingyi and Zhou Yang. Lu Dingyi suffered the most, being criticized by Gao Gang as a "representative of bourgeois propaganda" and "bureaucrat." As a result, he was removed from his positions as Deputy Director of the State Council's Culture and Education Committee and Deputy Minister of the Propaganda Department, and transferred to the Central Committee's Policy Research Office as Deputy Director.

After Lu Dingyi left the Propaganda Department and Xu Teli retired, many positions suddenly opened up within the department. Gao Gang recommended Zhang Xiushan, a cadre from northern Shaanxi, for the position of First Deputy Minister of the Propaganda Department, and Xi Zhongxun did not object to his old comrade. Zhang Xiushan, after all, was Second Secretary of the Northeast Bureau, making him eligible for the position, and the Politburo meeting approved him smoothly. Duan Chengwei, who had previously been ranked at the bottom of the Propaganda Department, was promoted to Second Deputy Minister.

Li Shiping, Secretary-General of the Northeast Administrative Committee, was transferred to the central government to serve as Deputy Secretary-General and Director of the General Office of the Finance and Economics Committee.

Ma Mingfang, acting secretary of the Northwest Bureau, was transferred to the Central Committee as Second Deputy Minister of the Organization Department. Gao Gang, now a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and in charge of the Secretariat, tightened his control over the Central Party's work.

The Secretariat handles the day-to-day work of the Central Committee. Gao Gang is a member of the Standing Committee and presides over the Secretariat. Therefore, if he has something to report to, he can even bypass Comrade Xiu Yang and report directly to the Chairman.

There are not many problems with the procedure.

He originally wanted to recommend Rao Shushi as the Minister of Organization.

But no success.

Therefore, the Politburo took advantage of the opportunity of abolishing the local Central Bureau to recommend Ma Mingfang as the second deputy director of the Organization Department. Compared with the previous "Five Mas Entering Beijing", the cadres of the local Central Bureau who came to Beijing this time were much lower in rank.