Rebirth: I am in Jin-Cha-Ji

During the Anti-Japanese War, Xiao Yizhou served as a cadre in southern Hebei. He also followed Liu and Deng's army southward, becoming a cadre in the Central Plains Bureau. Like Hao Zhongshi, he ultimately ended up in Guangxi. When Zhang Yunyi and Chen Manyuan were in charge of Guangxi affairs, they detained many cadres from the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan region and the Central Plains Bureau in Guangxi.

Qian Ying is familiar with them all.

Qian Ying was the head of the Organization Department of the Central South Bureau back then. This time, Qian Ying came with a bad temper, so he didn't treat Chen Manyuan and the others well. Qian Ying also bluntly stated that he wanted to personally visit the affected areas.

Although Wu Daifeng and his inspection team encountered setbacks in Guangxi, they had been there for over a month and had a rough idea of ​​the affected areas, though they were unable to grasp the specific circumstances.

So Qian Ying didn't rest at all.

We need to personally visit the disaster-stricken areas to understand the actual situation. Qian Ying, born in 53, suffered in prison during the Agrarian Revolution, so his health is not very good. However, Qian Ying still insisted on visiting the disaster-stricken areas, visiting several villages in a single day.

It took nearly a month to visit almost all the disaster-stricken areas.

Talk to cadres and the masses at all levels to understand what happened in Guangxi in the first half of this year.

The matter is not complicated to investigate.

If the local government hadn't interfered, Wu Daifeng would have been able to investigate thoroughly. Now that Qian Ying has led the investigation team, and the Guangxi Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Government have stopped obstructing them, Qian Ying has already obtained results in the past month.

Is it a natural disaster?

It was indeed a natural disaster. Since January of this year, severe natural disasters have struck many areas of Guangxi. Floods and droughts have hit many parts of the country, affecting over 1 million mu (approximately one-third) of Guangxi's total cultivated land.

Grain production decreased by more than 10 billion jin.

The bigger problem was that some areas of Guangxi had already been hit by disasters in 1955. However, Guangxi's agricultural development had been good in recent years, so many towns and villages had some surplus grain. Therefore, although they were hit by the disaster in 1955, they managed to get through it.

But it stopped working after 1956.

Although towns and villages also stored grain, the amount was limited, so by 1956 there was not much grain in reserve.

Food shortages began to appear in the affected areas.

Originally, this wasn't a big deal. As long as the Guangxi provincial government was serious about disaster relief, the grain reserves it had accumulated over the years would have been enough to handle the current situation. Even if Guangxi province couldn't handle the problem on its own, as long as it reported it to the central government, it would naturally allocate grain to Guangxi.

China's agriculture has developed well in recent years and grain reserves are still sufficient.

Although Guangxi suffered severe damage, the food shortage was only temporary. With proactive disaster relief efforts, the situation would have eased quickly once the autumn harvest arrived. After all, Guangxi is located in the south, allowing for two or three planting seasons. Therefore, recovering from the disaster was much easier than in northern regions. However, even after receiving warnings from Guangdong and Hunan, the Guangxi Provincial Party Committee and Government also began disaster relief.

However, they were careless and did not really take the issue of disaster relief seriously. They even did not think the disaster was that serious and just wanted to provide disaster relief casually.

Not only was the action slow, but the disaster investigation was also not thorough.

Guangxi's grain-producing areas were intermingled with the disaster-stricken areas. Consequently, when Guangxi provided disaster relief, some affected areas bordering grain-producing areas were left alone, presumably because they were not seriously affected. When the provincial government drafted its disaster relief plan, it failed to send anyone to thoroughly assess the situation. Instead, they sat in their offices, relying on their imaginations and the reports from below, and devised a haphazard plan.

As a result, major problems arose in those grain-producing areas that the province did not pay any attention to.

The disaster was the worst there.

Soon, food became scarce, leading to a severe famine. Residents began to flee their homes, fleeing the famine to Hunan and Guangdong. The Guangdong and Hunan provincial committees again alerted the Guangxi provincial government, but they remained unfazed. The Guangxi provincial government continued to dismiss the issue as limited to "some areas, a few townships, and individual households," and that there was no widespread disaster in Guangxi.

The original disaster relief plan was not changed, nor was disaster relief put at the top of the agenda.

It's safe to say that the entire Guangxi system was flawed. The provincial party committee and government neglected to understand the disaster, failing to understand the situation and issuing blind orders from within the province. The prefecture district paid little attention to reports from the counties below. Even after receiving news of the disaster, Yang Lin, secretary of the Pingle Prefectural Party Committee, not only failed to send personnel to inspect the affected areas, but even criticized officials who reported on the production cuts and the disaster at a meeting as "rightist." Consequently, lower-level officials were forced to review their mistakes at the meetings, daring not to report the true extent of the famine.

As the disaster continued to develop and worsen, it remained unattended. This was the attitude of the provincial party committee and government, and even the district leaders below them lied about the extent of the disaster. Consequently, the reports received by the Guangxi provincial party committee and government consistently stated that the disaster was not that serious.

What works first and what works next.

This is true above and of course below.

Leaders of some of the lower-level counties also began to learn the attitudes of the province and the prefecture.

Instead of paying attention to the disaster, they criticized the reports of some township officials. Wang Wenlu, the Party Secretary of Lipu County, was a prime example. He was the first to report the disaster. However, at the conference, he was unexpectedly criticized by Yang Lin, the Party Secretary of Pingle Prefecture, who accused him of "rightist deviation." Upon returning to Lipu County, he began criticizing district and township officials, discouraging them from reporting the true extent of the famine.

With everyone at all levels treating the disaster this way, the problem remained unresolved by May and June. Instead, it worsened, with people beginning to starve to death. Some officials in Guangxi, distraught over the situation, secretly wrote letters of denunciation to the central government.

This is why the Supervisory Committee sent out central supervisors.

This is a typical "man-made disaster".

In its report, the Central Investigation Team listed all officials implicated in the incident and detailed their share of responsibility. In particular, Guangxi Provincial Party Secretary Chen Manyuan, Guangxi Governor Hao Zhongshi, and Guangxi Vice Governor Xiao Yizhou were singled out by the team. The team concluded that these three individuals bore the greatest responsibility among the officials within the Guangxi Provincial Party Committee and Government.

Qian Ying singled out every single one of the officials at the Pingle Prefectural Party Committee and the Special Administrative Region, who were responsible for the most severe disaster, the most serious concealment of the truth, and the most deaths from starvation, besides the officials at the county level. Qian Ying recorded everything they said and did during this incident.

995 Malfeasance

"How can this be called a Party cadre?"

In early September 1956, the report of the Central Investigation Group arrived at the central government.

It's too big a matter.

Wei Hongjun immediately handed the report to several members of the Standing Committee.

The Chairman immediately convened a meeting of the Standing Committee. He was furious because this famine was completely unnecessary. Is the country now out of food?

Not to mention the national grain reserves, even Guangdong and Hunan, which surround Guangxi, have ample grain reserves. Grain production has been increasing in recent years, so governments at all levels have established reserves. As long as Guangxi can seriously address the disaster this time, there's no shortage of food to be found.

If serious disaster relief efforts had been made, this incident would have been over quickly. Guangxi would have been harvesting by now, and the famine would have long since passed. However, it was precisely because of the indifference of the people of Guangxi to the disaster, and the mutual deception of this "man-made disaster," that not only did the famine persist, but the harvest was also a complete mess.

A problem that could have been resolved in March or April has been dragged on until now. A problem that could have been solved with 100 million or 200 million kilograms of grain has now required an estimated 100 million kilograms of grain and still not be resolved.

Of course, the central government doesn’t mind spending more food.

The biggest problem this time is that people actually died. Although the actual death toll is low because many victims fled to Guangdong and Hunan, even if it is low, it is still a death in peacetime.

This way the nature is completely different.

"This matter cannot end like this. According to the division of responsibilities established by the Supervisory Commission and the Ministry of Supervision, these officials must be dealt with. The Guangxi Provincial Party Committee and the Provincial Government bear great responsibility for this matter, and they must not be tolerated."

The commander-in-chief was also angry.

Eight years after the founding of New China, famine still occurred and people starved to death.

Disasters are normal for a country as large as China. As long as the government actively provides disaster relief, that's fine. But the problem in Guangxi isn't a "natural disaster"; it's a problem with the leadership of the region.

Chen Manyuan's disobedience to the order to advance into Hebei, Rehe, and Liaoning had already caused some dissatisfaction among the Central Committee. However, considering Chen Manyuan's qualifications and past performance, the Central Committee still gave him a chance.

Otherwise, he would not have had the opportunity to become the Secretary of the Guangxi Provincial Party Committee.

But this time it was done very poorly.

Not only did he perform poorly himself, but his leadership of the Guangxi cadre team was also extremely poor.

"I think we still lack the intensity and basis for punishment in handling these matters."

Wei Hongjun spoke.

He said, "At present, when our cadres encounter problems, unless they accept bribes, they are only dealt with within the Party and the organization. They are usually removed from office, punished within the Party, shelved for a period of time, and then reinstated. This kind of treatment itself condones our cadres to make mistakes, or even commit crimes. Just like this incident, the leading cadres in Guangxi did not make mistakes, but committed crimes. They clearly knew about the disaster, but they concealed it, ignored it, and did not provide disaster relief, which ultimately led to a food shortage and people starving to death."

"Mistakes are understandable and can be corrected. Mistakes are problems of understanding and experience, so there are deviations in how they are handled, not intentional or subjective errors. However, if our Party members and cadres intentionally fail to perform their duties, leading to serious consequences, they will be dealt with more severely and at the legal level. However, we currently have no specific penalties or legal provisions for this. If we continue to do so and only handle matters within the Party, such incidents will continue to occur."

Such a serious incident happened this time. Will people like Chen Manyuan receive any punishment?

not at all.

They are all internal party handling and administrative penalties.

The most that can happen is dismissal from office, followed by a serious warning within the party, or even more serious probation within the party, and there will not even be expulsion from the party.

Then they could study at the Party School for a few years, or sit on the bench for a few years, and then be able to return to work after a few years. Chen Manyuan was a Level 6 administrative cadre, a lower rank than provincial Party secretaries in other provinces, but still a senior Party official. After such a serious incident, nothing happened, and he continued to enjoy high office and generous salaries. But what about the people who died because of their disregard for the interests of the people? How will the Party answer to them?

Could it be that such a serious mistake was dealt with so simply?

But this is indeed the current way of dealing with cadres.

This was something Wei Hongjun could not tolerate.

In fact, in Wei Hongjun's opinion, what happened in Guangxi was even worse than the "leftist policy" of land reform. Because many of the problems that occurred during the land reform were not caused by the bad intentions of the land reform cadres. It was more because land reform was the first time in China, so many cadres did not fully understand it and did not implement it, so problems arose. Even if such front-line cadres made mistakes, Wei Hongjun would be somewhat tolerant. What happened in Guangxi was the result of the cadres' blatant disregard for the disaster, and more seriously, the disregard for human life and the people.

They all think of themselves as founding heroes and have forgotten their original intentions of joining the revolution. They are no different from those warlord officials of the Republic of China who disregarded human lives and ignored the interests and needs of the people.

It is a true dereliction of duty.

Many aspects of the current central government's thinking are still stuck in the war era, and many issues are handled using methods from the war era. This includes the treatment of cadres who have made mistakes, which is also based on the thinking of the war era.

If a mistake is made, the party’s handling of the matter ends there.

But this should not be the approach of a ruling party in peacetime.

It may sound unpleasant, but in wartime, human life is worth less than a dog's. Even thousands or tens of thousands of deaths, let alone a few, are just numbers. Because wartime kills so many people, even a modest number of deaths wouldn't cause a stir. But in peacetime, human life becomes more precious.

In wartime, if you make a mistake and some people die, it's not a serious matter. No one would accuse you of committing a crime, because wartime is inherently about death.

But it’s different in peacetime.

Death in peacetime is not inevitable. Many of the unnatural deaths that occur are due to improper handling by Party members and cadres. If we continue to handle the situation with the same methods we used during wartime, there will be endless consequences.

After all, with such a serious incident, officials at all levels were only dismissed from their posts and given internal Party warnings. Who would care about the other senior officials? Those senior officials all had their own factions behind them, and as long as they weren't killed off, they all had a chance to make a comeback.

This treatment is like tickling them.

If there is no deterrent effect, such things will happen frequently in the future.

"Comrade Red Army, what do you mean?"

The commander-in-chief has always been in charge of party discipline.

So, after hearing Wei Hongjun's words, he took them seriously. Wei Hongjun said, "I believe that making mistakes and committing crimes are different. It's inevitable for our Party members and cadres to make mistakes in their work. After all, no one is perfect. But committing a crime is violating the law and should be judged by the Party and the people. Just like this incident, it was actually the cadres of the Provincial Party Committee and the Provincial Government who neglected their duties, completely ignored the disaster, and showed no concern for the people affected. The cadres of the prefectures and counties below not only ignored the reports from below, but also suppressed the voices of the cadres below and whitewashed the situation. It was precisely because of the dereliction of duty of the Guangxi cadres that people starved to death. Such cadres must be convicted at the legal level."

"I propose that we establish a 'malfeasance crime' specifically targeting our cadres. The legal committee should discuss the specific provisions and formulate relevant laws. In the future, our cadres who violate party discipline will be dealt with within the party. However, cadres who commit 'malfeasance' will be handed over to judicial organs and tried according to the circumstances. Only with such strong measures will our cadres understand what they should do."

"Malfeasance?"

The commander-in-chief muttered to himself.

Wei Hongjun said, "Yes, it's dereliction of duty. We must understand that dereliction of duty is a crime. This cannot be simply covered up by bureaucracy. The Party and the people have given you this position so that you can serve the Party and the people well. If you neglect your duties in this position and cause losses to the Party, the country, and the people, then that is dereliction of duty. Trials can be conducted based on the extent of the losses and the degree of dereliction of duty."

Wei Hongjun is now a member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee. Rather than dealing with one or two specific matters, he is more concerned about establishing an effective system.

In fact, given Wei Hongjun's current status and rank, he could definitely recommend severe punishment for the Guangxi officials, and there wouldn't be much opposition from the Politburo Standing Committee. This would both make him feel better and provide an explanation to the people of Guangxi who have been harmed.

This is the easiest and fastest way.

But what happens after it’s done?

What will happen next time something like this happens? Will we have to convene a Politburo Standing Committee meeting, as we did this time? Or will we convene a Politburo meeting? And then handle the matter based on the temperament, personality, or preferences of some party leaders at the time?

This is equivalent to having no rules.

If a few party leaders want to deal with someone severely, they will deal with him severely. If they are in a better mood, or if they like the cadre or have a historical connection with him and want to let him go, then they will let him go lightly. This time, Wei Hongjun was very unhappy with him, so he had to deal with him severely. What if he ran into one of Wei Hongjun's old subordinates one day?

Many old comrades came to plead for mercy?

Wei Hongjun is not a saint either.

Everyone has preferences, likes and dislikes; this is unavoidable. Wei Hongjun had been involved in the revolution for so many years, and some of his associates were old comrades and former subordinates with whom he had close personal relationships. When they made mistakes, someone came to plead for them. Could he have been completely ruthless?