The finance minister scooped up half a spoonful, blew on it, and then suddenly remembered something, so he put the spoon down.

"Speaking of which," he glanced at President Zhou, "there's something that's been hotly debated in China lately, and it's been troubling Old Zhou too."

President Zhou held his teacup but did not respond immediately.

Lu Ze also scooped up a spoonful of soup.

"What's the problem?"

"It's not a new problem."

President Zhou put down his teacup. "It's just that the debates have become much more intense since this crisis."

He organized his thoughts a little.

"Over the years, we have been pushing forward financial reforms. Interest rates have been gradually liberalized, the bond market has been developed, the exchange rate formation mechanism has been improved, and the capital account is also preparing to be gradually opened. We have been working on these things for many years, and although there have been debates, the basic direction is clear."

"The situation changed after September this year."

"Some people now believe that the US financial crisis has fully demonstrated the problems with market-oriented reforms. The US has the world's most developed financial market, with complex financial products, free capital flows, and the most perfect pricing mechanism. But what was the result? Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, Merrill Lynch was acquired, AIG was taken over by the government, and several large investment banks ran into problems one after another."

"They believe this shows that financial liberalization itself carries significant risks. China has been criticized for years for having too many financial controls, opening up too slowly, and having too many state-owned banks. But looking back now, it was precisely these factors that allowed China's financial system to avoid this crisis. Our banks did not hold large amounts of complex derivative products, did not have 30 times leverage, and did not rely on overnight repurchase agreements to maintain operations, so the direct impact was very limited."

"Therefore, they advocate slowing down the pace of reforms, and some reforms should even be temporarily halted."

President Zhou paused for a moment.

"Another group of people hold a completely different view. They believe that China did not suffer from the same financial crisis mainly because our financial market is not yet developed enough and lacks the complex financial instruments found in the United States. Just because the market is imperfect and therefore no certain type of risk has occurred does not mean that the existing system is superior. They advocate for continuing to push forward with reforms."

He looked at Lu Ze.

"Both sides are now using the US situation to prove their point. One side argues that the US crisis demonstrates a fundamental problem with financial liberalization; the other side argues that the level of financial development in China is too far behind that of the US, and therefore reforms cannot be negated."

The finance minister took a sip of soup but made no comment.

Lu Ze roughly understood why they had brought up this topic; their views on this issue were probably not entirely consistent.

Governor Zhou has been pushing for financial market reforms for years. Now that the US is experiencing such a severe crisis, many of his policies are naturally being questioned. And those who question him are not without reason. The losses suffered by the US financial system are undeniable and cannot be ignored.

"Bank president," Lu Ze said, "I wouldn't dare say I'm qualified to answer the question you're arguing about. However, I can talk about the situation in the United States."

"Speaking."

"I don't think the problems the US is facing this time can be simply attributed to too much financial innovation."

Lu Ze thought for a moment.

"The more significant problem is that the pace of financial product development has outpaced the market's and regulators' ability to identify and assess risks."

"The first issue is pricing. The credit ratings for those structured products are given by rating agencies, but the rating agencies' revenue comes from the product issuers, which inherently creates a conflict of interest."

"This issue has been debated before," said Governor Zhou. "The fee structure of rating agencies has never been fundamentally changed."

"Yes. And there's also the issue of models. Many models are based on historical data, and one important assumption is that housing prices in different regions of the United States will not fall sharply at the same time. Data from the past few decades seems to support this assumption, but since 2007, the situation has been completely different."

"Therefore, the credit risk of a large number of structured products has been underestimated," said Governor Zhou.

"Yes. The entire market has traded trillions of dollars worth of assets based on these ratings and valuations. When the underlying assumptions break down, the original prices can no longer be maintained."

President Zhou nodded.

"There's also the issue of information disclosure. Especially with over-the-counter derivatives, transactions are scattered among various institutions, making it difficult for regulators to grasp the overall market's risk exposure."

"That's the second point I wanted to make."

Lu Ze said, "There are also Level 3 assets, whose valuation mainly relies on the institution's internal model, and the parameters are also determined by the institution itself. As for those special purpose entities, although many are not included in the bank's balance sheet, the bank actually provides credit support. Once a problem occurs, the related risks will still fall back on the bank."

"In this way, simply looking at a bank's balance sheet may not be enough to determine how much risk it actually bears," said Governor Zhou.

"That's right. Before the crisis, even many counterparties didn't know how much risk they were facing from the institutions they were dealing with."

President Zhou put down his teacup.

"However, I think there is another problem that is even more difficult to solve."

"You mean the exit strategy for large financial institutions?"

"Yes. If an institution is too large and involves too many counterparties, it is difficult for the government to allow it to go bankrupt directly. But if it is bailed out every time, it will create a moral hazard."

"That's how Bear Stearns was."

Lu Ze said, "After it received the bailout, other institutions also began to expect that the government would not allow large investment banks to fail. As a result, when financial institutions take on risks, they will take into account the support that the government may provide. Profits go to shareholders and management, but if there are significant losses, the government and taxpayers may have to bear the burden."

"But we can't just not provide assistance either," President Zhou said with a wry smile. "When it really comes to that, we'll have to consider more than just this one institution."

"Yes. Therefore, an exit mechanism must be established in advance. Waiting until a crisis has already occurred before deciding whether to provide assistance or not is extremely passive."

President Zhou thought for a while.

"Another problem in the United States is that there are too many regulatory agencies, and their responsibilities overlap."

"The problem with AIG this time is very typical," Lu Ze said. "The SEC is responsible for the securities market, the OCC is responsible for national banks, the OTS is responsible for savings and loan institutions, and insurance business is mainly regulated by the states. Because AIG Group has savings and loan institutions under its umbrella, the group-level supervision falls on the OTS."

"And OTS is not good at regulating such complex financial groups."

"Yes. AIG's financial products division bore a huge amount of credit derivatives risk, but the OTS, which was responsible for the group's supervision, lacked the corresponding professional capabilities and regulatory resources. There are so many regulatory agencies in the United States, but in the end, none of them were able to fully grasp the overall risk of AIG."

President Zhou did not speak immediately.

After a while, he asked, "So you believe the main problem lies in the mismatch between the pace of financial innovation and institutional development?"

"This is my judgment," Lu Ze said. "Products are becoming increasingly complex, but the corresponding pricing mechanisms, information disclosure, risk management, and regulatory capabilities have not kept pace."

"So, according to you, the lesson is not to stop financial innovation."

"We cannot simply draw that conclusion. Before we have the corresponding risk assessment and handling capabilities, we should not allow these products to expand too rapidly."

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