Rebirth: I am in Jin-Cha-Ji

However, Wei Hongjun was the First Secretary of the Secretariat and a member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee, so it was best not to make such a proposal casually. Therefore, it was handed over to Comrade Deng Xixian to propose the matter.

After the meeting, Wei Hongjun submitted the proposal to Comrade Xiuyang. After Comrade Xiuyang approved it, it would be reported to the Chairman. In fact, once the Secretariat approved the proposal, it could be distributed to the various units below through the Propaganda Department.

Because the Secretariat has this power.

But Wei Hongjun was still very cautious.

I hope to get the approval of the Chairman and Comrade Xiuyang. Not only is this a sensitive issue, but it's also a matter of protocol. Gao Gang had previously reported to the Chairman directly without going through Comrade Xiuyang, a violation of Party discipline.

Unless the Politburo entrusts Wei Hongjun with full authority over the central party affairs, the necessary procedures must still be followed.

Secretariat meetings are not held every day. Everyone usually handles their own responsibilities, but if there are no urgent matters, we will hold two or three Secretariat meetings a week.

Wei Hongjun did not expect that the Chairman would call him on the same night the Secretariat report was submitted.

Less than half a day had passed since the incident.

Wei Hongjun arrived at the Chairman's place and found him sitting on a small bench in the courtyard, reading the Secretariat's report on revolutionary historical novels. Seeing Wei Hongjun approach, the Chairman put down the report and said, "Sit down."

The Chairman casually pointed to the small bench to Wei Hongjun.

The Chairman did not discuss the report directly. Instead, he handed Wei Hongjun an article and said, "Take a look at this article first."

Wei Hongjun took it.

刚刚读了开头一段，魏红军就坐直了身子。因为这是一篇主席在1941年9月写的“关于1931年9月至1935年1月中央路线的批判”。

In September 1931, Wang Ming, Wu Hao, Lu Futan, Bo Gu and Zhang Wentian held a meeting to discuss and formally determine the list of members of the Provisional Central Political Bureau, which was also the day when the Provisional Central Committee was established.

January 1935 was the day of the Zunyi Conference.

This is a critical article in which the Chairman criticized the erroneous line from the establishment of the Provisional Central Committee to the Zunyi Conference.

September 1941 was when Chairman Mao was preparing for the "Yan'an Rectification Movement."

During this period, the CCP held a very important meeting, known as the "September Conference." This was an enlarged Politburo meeting convened by Chairman Mao to prepare for the next phase of the Rectification Movement. It began a formal review of the CCP's leadership line during the latter part of the ten-year Agrarian Revolution.

Judging from the time, Wei Hongjun believed that this article should have been written by the Chairman during the September meeting.

The article was quite long, reaching 50,000 to 60,000 words. But Wei Hongjun had never seen it. Now a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, there were few Party and government documents he couldn't read.

Moreover, after the founding of the People's Republic of China, the central government published a special collection of "Selected Works of Li Desheng," but this article was not included. But an article of 50,000 to 60,000 words, written for the Rectification Movement, must be quite important. How could I not have read it?

Wei Hongjun suppressed his doubts and continued reading.

The more Wei Hongjun looked, the more surprised he became.

In this article, Chairman Mao comprehensively criticized the central government's policy at the time, from political, economic, and military perspectives. His summary of these issues was exceptional, hitting the nail on the head. He identified the root causes of the problems that arose.

The Zunyi Conference only resolved the issue of the military line, while the Yan'an Rectification Movement and the Seventh National Congress resolved the issue of the political line. The political line issues subsequently resolved by the Yan'an Rectification Movement and the Seventh National Congress are all centrally reflected in this article.

However, Wei Hongjun soon discovered the difference in this article.

Perhaps Chairman Mao was quite emotional when he wrote this article, so when he criticized the then-central political line, he directly criticized many central leaders by name. He rarely pointed out the mistakes made by specific leaders in his articles.

While Wei Hongjun was reading this article, the Chairman was reading a document next to him.

It took a while for Wei Hongjun to finish reading the article. The Chairman put down the book in his hand and said, "Have you finished reading it?"

"Yes."

"After I finished writing this article, I originally intended to publish it publicly. It would serve as a summary of the history of our Party and the Soviet Area, and would be used in the Rectification Movement and the Seventh National Congress. However, I ultimately did not publish it. I only showed it to Comrade Xiu Yang and Comrade Ren Peiguo. You are the third person to see it."

Wei Hongjun couldn't help but take another look at the article in his hand.

During the Rectification Movement and the Seventh National Congress, Comrade Xiu Yang and Comrade Ren Peiguo both cooperated very well with the Chairman in both theory and organization to complete the work. It is clear that the Chairman had great trust in them both.

That's why I only showed this article to them two.

In fact, in this article, Chairman Mao also criticized Comrade Xiu Yang and Comrade Ren Peiguo. For example, Comrade Xiu Yang, as a member of the Provisional Central Political Bureau, was criticized by Chairman Mao for following the erroneous political line of the Soviet-educated faction at the time.

But Comrade Xiuyang was still allowed to see it, from which we can see the relationship between the Chairman and Comrade Xiuyang at that time.

In this article, the Chairman criticized Wang Ming, Bo Gu, and Zhang Wentian the most. During the September meeting, a truly sensational event occurred. During his self-criticism, Wang Ming suddenly lost his temper and revealed a huge "secret."

He stated that before leaving China for the Soviet Union, he had only granted Wang Ming and Zhang Wentian temporary authority to handle Central Committee affairs. He never formally allowed the Provisional Central Political Bureau to replace the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China, nor did he instruct Comrade Bo Gu to become a Central Committee leader. The subsequent rise of Comrades Bo Gu and Zhang Wentian to Central Committee leadership was due to the Provisional Central Committee "usurping" power within the Central Committee. This "secret" exposed by Wang Ming became the historically famous "Provisional Central Committee usurpation of power" incident.

Wang Ming stated that before leaving Shanghai, he had told Comrades Bo Gu, Zhang Wentian, and Wu Hao that once the Provisional Central Committee arrived in an area with a large number of Politburo members, it would have to cede power to the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee. This was because they were only temporarily handling Central Committee work and were not the de facto leaders of the CPC Central Committee. Bo Gu, Zhang Wentian, and others were not actual members of the Politburo, but only members of the Provisional Central Committee, a significant difference between the two.

This is what Wang Ming said.

However, the original regulations were that "in the future, when the majority of Central Committee members gather together, the list should be submitted to the Central Committee for discussion, and then the list should be submitted to the Communist International for approval." This was the leadership regulation for the Provisional Central Committee at the time.

The implication was that after the Provisional Central Committee arrived in the Central Soviet Area, it would convene a Central Committee meeting. Central Committee members would re-elect, reorganize the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, determine the Politburo membership, and then submit the results to the Communist International for approval. However, in reality, after arriving in the Central Soviet Area, the Provisional Central Committee merely convened a meeting of the Provisional Central Bureau members and the Soviet Area Central Bureau members. Participating in the meeting were eight people: Provisional Central Political Bureau members Bo Gu, Zhang Wentian, Chen Yun, and Xiu Yang; as well as the Chairman of the Soviet Area Central Bureau, Xiang Ying, Ren Peiguo, and Deng Fa.

Because the Provisional Central Committee represented the Central Committee when it arrived in the Central Soviet Area, the Soviet Area Central Bureau had no objections to the reorganization of the new Politburo. Therefore, the meeting smoothly established the new Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China. Bo Gu became Secretary of the Central Committee and the overall director, and Zhang Wentian became a member of the Standing Committee and Minister of Propaganda.

It was this incident that Wang Ming "exposed," stating that this was an attempt by the Provisional Central Committee to "usurp the throne."

Bo Gu and Zhang Wentian failed to inform the Provisional Central Committee of the regulations, nor did they notify the "Central Committee for discussion." Moreover, Comrade Wu Hao, who was at the front at the time, was aware of the regulations but did not raise them.

This is the famous "temporary central usurpation of the throne" incident.

Of course, the Chairman later reached a conclusion on this matter. At an enlarged Politburo meeting before the Seventh Congress, the Chairman stated: "Some comrades previously believed that the Provisional Central Committee and the Fifth Plenum were illegal. Now, it has been discovered that the Provisional Central Committee had received approval from the Communist International, and the Fifth Plenum had also received international approval. Therefore, it was legal, but the election procedures were incomplete."

Why did the Chairman handle the "temporary central government usurpation of the throne" incident so lightly?

This was because the Chairman did not believe that the problems in the Soviet area arose there. Given the blind faith in the Soviet Union within the Party at the time, even if a Central Committee meeting were held to reorganize the Politburo, there would not be much change in the end.

Because at the time, the Chinese Communist Party leaders generally believed in the Soviet Union's successful experience. This wasn't just one or two people, but the mainstream within the party at the time. The cadres who supported the Chairman's ideas were, in fact, the odd ones out.

At the time, the Chairman was preparing for the Rectification Movement and the Seventh National Congress, so he was reluctant to focus on such matters. He wanted to get to the root of this problem. Only by addressing the "dogmatism" of blind faith in the Soviet Union could the CCP avoid a recurrence of such an incident.

But it is obvious that the Chairman was still influenced by the "September Conference".

In this article, besides Wang Ming, Bo Gu, and Zhang Wentian, Comrade Wu Hao was the most criticized. Comrade Wu Hao's name appears frequently. No wonder the Chairman did not publish this article publicly.

The chairman at that time was still in the stage of building unity.

The main target of criticism is the "dogmatism" of the Soviet-educated group. If our party is to formally become independent, it is impossible to use Comrade Wu Hao as a target of criticism.

The Chairman said, "I have no intention of publishing this article publicly during my lifetime. I may circulate it among the members of the Politburo in the future so that everyone can learn from it. Do you know why I haven't published this article?"

"For the sake of party unity."

"Correct."

The Chairman said seriously, "Comrades of the Red Army, you must think carefully before handling any issue. A split within the Party is a very terrible thing. Unless it involves a serious line issue, the struggle within the Party must not be expanded to cause a real split within the Party. A broken mirror is hard to mend, and the same is true for a split within the Party. If you try to mend it by force, the rift will remain, and it will be difficult to heal. It was precisely because we did not understand this principle in the early days of the Chinese Revolution that we took so many detours."

"Our Party has grown from an initial membership of just over 50 to nearly 6 million members today. We've been on the brink of extinction several times, but we've persevered. However, our Party has grown from its youth to maturity, and many cadres have made mistakes along the way. These mistakes range from minor to major, and if we pursue them, the consequences will be endless."

"I asked you to read this article because I wanted you to know that as a leader, you can't just let your temper run wild. You have to firmly grasp the principal contradiction. Sometimes, in order to resolve the principal contradiction, you have to let go of some minor contradictions. But you're still better than me in this regard. You were only in your twenties during the War of Resistance, but you were already very mature. In my twenties and thirties, I was too hot-tempered and didn't know how to unite people, which caused a lot of losses during the revolution."

It is actually difficult for Wei Hongjun to understand the Chairman’s feelings when he wrote this article.

After all, Wei Hongjun had not experienced those things.

Back then, Wei Hongjun's rank was too low. He lacked the authority to launch a purge. Others, however, didn't target low-ranking cadres like Wei Hongjun. Therefore, he didn't experience the same emotions that Chairman Mao felt during his time in the Soviet areas.

Not only was he suppressed, but the cadres close to him were also suppressed. More importantly, the Chairman saw that a wrong line was endangering the revolution but was powerless to change it.

But the chairman still held back.

The Chairman then took the Secretariat's report on "Revolutionary Historical Novels" and said, "This report is very well written. Some scars should be made public only after the individuals involved are older and have healed. This will benefit everyone. Many historical issues cannot be delved into too deeply. If they are, they will inevitably cause divisions among Party cadres and affect Party unity."

"yes ."

"Why did Comrade Deng Xixian suddenly come up with such a suggestion?"

"It was the Workers' Publishing House who invited Comrade Li Jiantong, the sister-in-law of Comrade Liu Zhidan, to write a biographical novel about Comrade Liu Zhidan. They approached Comrade Xi Zhongxun, hoping to gain his support. Comrade Xi Zhongxun was well aware of the complexity of the revolutionary history of northern Shaanxi and was therefore very troubled. Comrade Deng Xixian and I saw this and both believed that these issues were difficult to handle at this stage. That's why we came up with this proposal."

"Comrade Liu Zhidan should be remembered, but it is indeed inappropriate to write a novel at this stage."

The chairman nodded.

Solving the revolutionary history issues in northern Shaanxi caused the central government quite a headache for a while.

If it were written now, it would inevitably cause some controversy.

While the two were talking, Ye Zilong walked in and said, "Chairman, the Prime Minister wants to see you urgently."

"Please."

Soon the Prime Minister came in hurriedly.

Seeing Wei Hongjun simply nod, he continued, "The Soviet newspaper Pravda published an article today titled 'Why is the cult of personality incompatible with the spirit of Marxism-Leninism?' Citing 'A Concise Course in the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)' and 'A Biography of Stalin,' it accused Comrade Stalin of taking all the credit for himself. This is the original article we just translated."

The chairman took it immediately.

Although the 20th Congress of the CPSU had been criticizing the "cult of personality" on a large scale and had insinuated Comrade Stalin, it had never explicitly mentioned Comrade Stalin until the "Secret Report".

After that, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union continued to conceal the matter.

They instructed lower-level Party organizations to study the "secret report," but also prevented its circulation. They also avoided directly criticizing Comrade Stalin in public, creating an awkward atmosphere for Soviet propaganda in March. After all, the situation in many parts of the Soviet Union was already quite turbulent, with numerous clashes. Yet, the CPSU Central Committee remained unwilling to address the questions directly.

But as soon as the article in Pravda came out, the Central Committee of the CPSU had already made a direct statement.

Because this was the first time that the CPSU Central Committee publicly criticized Comrade Stalin's "personality cult." It seemed that Khrushchev and the CPSU Central Committee had no intention of covering up.

The chairman did not read the article carefully, but just glanced at it.

The Chairman was not concerned about the content of the article, but the attitude of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

"The 'Secret Report' will soon be spread all over the world."

The chairman made a judgment immediately.

With the CPSU Central Committee adopting this stance, the spread of the "Secret Report" would accelerate. The Chairman immediately told Wei Hongjun, "After the Secretariat returns, immediately begin propaganda according to the original plan. The article 'On the Historical Experience of the Proletarian Dictatorship' must also be published as soon as possible to present our Party's perspective on this matter. We must build momentum before the 'Secret Report' is fully introduced into China, minimizing its impact as much as possible."

"Yes."

"There's one more thing. Eugene just came to me and said that Comrade Khrushchev and Comrade Mikoyan want to visit China secretly. He hopes to get our consent."

The Prime Minister delivered another message.

The Chairman nodded and said, "I agree to their request. Some issues should be discussed with Comrade Khrushchev in person."

The Chairman was ready.

He wanted to have a good talk with Khrushchev about the relationship between the "father party" and the "brother party," and also discuss more economic cooperation issues between the two sides. Of course, the Chairman also wanted to ask Khrushchev in person about his "three peaces" theory.

There is also the impact that the "secret report" will have on the socialist camp, etc.

We need to have a good talk.

988 Khrushchev's secret visit to China

On April 1956, 4, Khrushchev and Mikoyan came to China in a very low-key manner.